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Primary Program Responsibilities
• Characterize the orbital debris environment to 
support risk assessments for all NASA projects and 
programs.
– Ground-based and space-based measurements
– Breakup and population modeling
– Hypervelocity impact phenomenology and effects
• Provide technical and policy level assistance to 
NASA HQ, other US Government agencies and the 
commercial sector.
• Represent the US in international fora, including the 
United Nations and the Inter-Agency Space Debris 
Coordination Committee (IADC).
• Evaluate risk of human casualties from satellite 
reentries.
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Orbital Debris Program Overview
Measurements
Ground-based and in-
situ measurements of 
debris smaller than 10-
cm diameter
Modeling
Develop near-term 
engineering, long-term 
evolutionary, and special 
purpose models 
Risk Assessment
Develop software tools to 
permit risk assessments 
for all NASA space 
projects:  human space 
flight and robotic
Debris 
      Assessment 
                  Software
Normal Operations 
Accidental Explosions
Intenational Breakups 
On-Orbit Collisions  
Postmission Disposal 
Reentry Survival  
Satellite Breakup
Risk Assessment
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Orbital Debris Program Interfaces
• NASA Orbital Debris Program 
established at JSC in 1979.
• Currently funded directly 
from HQ OSMA.
• Recognized as world
leader in environment
definition and modeling
and in mitigation policy
development.
• Close cooperation with 
DoD in a variety of 
space situational
awareness areas.
US Government
OSTP DoD
DOT/FAA State
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United Nations
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OD Economics
S/C License Assmts
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Core Orbital Debris Program
NPR 8715.6
NS 8719.14
Satellite Reentries
United Nations
Int. Strategy
Space Shuttle,
ISS, ELVs
On-orbit and 
reentry risk 
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External
RelationsAdvisory
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Program Office
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For more information – see our website at:
http://orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov/
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Why Orbital Debris Mitigation?
• U.S. has endorsed the United Nations’ Orbital Debris Mitigation Guidelines.
• President’s National Space Policy directs agencies and departments to 
implement U.S. Government Orbital Debris Mitigation Standard Practices.
• In compliance with above, NASA has established NPR 8715.6A, NASA 
Procedural Requirements for Limiting Orbital Debris, and NS 8719.14A, 
Process for Limiting Orbital Debris.
– Formal Orbital Debris Assessment Reports (ODARs) are due to NASA HQ in 
conjunction with the PDR, CDR, and SMSR milestones.
To preserve near-Earth space for future generations
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Characterizing the Earth’s 
Satellite Population:  
Sources of Orbital Debris
Orbital Debris Program Office
NASA Johnson Space Center
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Growth of the Earth Satellite Population
Cataloged objects >10 cm diameter
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Growth of the Earth Satellite Population
Cataloged objects >10 cm diameter
1975
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
6 Orbital Debris Program Office
Growth of the Earth Satellite Population
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Growth of the Earth Satellite Population
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Growth of the Earth Satellite Population
Cataloged objects >10 cm diameter
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Growth of the Earth Satellite Population
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Growth of the Earth Satellite Population
Cataloged objects >10 cm diameter
2000
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Growth of the Earth Satellite Population
Cataloged objects >10 cm diameter
2005
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Growth of the Earth Satellite Population
Cataloged objects >10 cm diameter
2010
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Orbital Debris in Motion
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Orbital Debris:  A Perspective by Frank and Ernest
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What is Orbital Debris?
• Orbital debris is any object in Earth orbit which no longer serves 
a useful function.
Non-operational Spacecraft
Derelict Launch Vehicle Stages
Fragmentation and 
Mission-related Debris
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Non-operational Spacecraft
• More than 7000 spacecraft have been 
placed into Earth orbit since Sputnik 1 
in 1957.
• Currently, >3500 spacecraft remain in 
Earth orbit.
– ~1000 are operational; the rest are orbital 
debris
• Small:  Picosats and Microsats
– Operational lifetimes typically months to a 
few years
• Large:  Geosynchronous spacecraft
– Operational lifetimes typically a decade or 
more
Cubesats:  1 kg
TDRS 1:  2 metric tons
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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Growth of Spacecraft in Earth Orbit
~ 2500 are non-operational
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Launch Vehicle Stages
• More than 5500 launch vehicle stages 
have been placed into Earth orbit since 
Sputnik 1 in 1957.
• Currently, >1750 launch vehicle stages 
remain in Earth orbit.
• Sizes range from <100 kg to 9 metric tons
Atlas V Centaur stage
Pegasus 
upper stage
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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Growth of Launch Vehicle Stages in Earth Orbit
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Mission-related Debris
• During the launch and satellite 
deployment processes, some 
debris can be generated, e.g., 
sensor and engine covers, straps, 
springs, and yo-yo despin weights.
• Most spacecraft and launch 
vehicles are now designed to 
eliminate or limit the generation of 
mission-related debris.
– One exception is for
multiple payload
launches, e.g., Ariane 
and Delta 2
Ariane 5 SYLDA 
Payload 
Dispenser
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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Growth of Mission-related Debris
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Fragmentation Debris
• The majority of debris in Earth orbit has originated from the fragmentation 
of spacecraft and rocket bodies.
• Fragmentation events can generally be classified in one of three categories:
– Anomalous events:  Typically one or a few debris released at low velocities, often 
possessing higher than normal area-to-mass ratios.  Many of these debris have short 
orbital lifetimes.  More than 100 events identified with spacecraft and upper stages.
– Explosions: Intentional or accidental, resulting in only a few to several hundreds of 
large debris and many more smaller debris.  Ejection velocities range from very low to 
very high for a single event.  200 events identified.
– Collisions: Also can be intentional or accidental.  Debris distributions similar to 
explosions.  Two major events since 2007.
NASA, U.S., and international guidelines and standards seek to 
eliminate or limit the occurrence of satellite fragmentations of all kinds.
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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Top Ten Worst Satellite Breakups
(based on cataloged debris)
*  As of 5 February 2013
Total:  8853           Total:  5525         
COMMON NAME CATALOGED DEBRIS* DEBRIS IN ORBIT* YEAR OF BREAKUP ALTITUDE OF BREAKUP CAUSE OF BREAKUP
Fengyun‐1C 3378 3070 2007 850 km Intentional Collision
Cosmos 2251 1603 1339 2009 790 km Accidental Collision
STEP 2 Rocket Body 710 55 1996 625 km Accidental Explosion
Iridium 33 598 473 2009 790 km Accidental Collision
Cosmos 2421 509 0 2008 410 km Unknown
SPOT 1 Rocket Body 492 31 1986 805 km Accidental Explosion
OV 2‐1 / LCS 2 Rocket Body 473 35 1965 740 km Accidental Explosion
Nimbus 4 Rocket Body 375 243 1970 1075 km Accidental Explosion
TES Rocket Body 371 106 2001 670 km Accidental Explosion
CBERS 1 Rocket Body 344 173 2000 740 km Accidental Explosion
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NOAA 6 Anomalous Events
• NOAA 6 (launched 27 June 1979) has experienced at least two 
anomalous events, 13 and 16 years after launch, respectively
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Nimbus 2 Debris Releases
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• Debris releases began ~30 years after launch
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SEASAT Debris Events
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• Debris releases began 5 years after launch; debris   
exhibited different average area-to-mass ratios
SEASAT
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COBE Debris Cloud
• COBE released 76 debris 3-4 years after launch in 1989 while still operational; 
most debris decayed within 4-5 years of release; all have now reentered.
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Launch Vehicle Upper Stage Explosions
• Until 2007 launch vehicle upper stage explosions were the single greatest 
contributor to the hazardous debris environment.
• Nearly all these explosions occurred after successful satellite deployment 
missions.  The time of the event varied from 24 hours after launch to more 
than two decades after launch.
– Passivation of the upper stages after mission completion (removal of residual 
propellants and pressurants) has been highly successful in preventing such explosions.
• In Feb 2006, a Proton Briz M malfunctioned, leaving a large amount of 
propellants on board.  One year later it exploded into an estimated 1000+ 
large fragments.
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Worst Launch Vehicle Upper Stage Explosions
* As of February 2013
• All missions except Titan Transtage performed their satellite delivery 
missions successfully. 
• A Proton Briz M might have produced 1000 or more debris in February 
2007, but cataloging the debris has been difficult.
Stage Type Breakup Year Time in Orbit Debris Cataloged* Assessed Cause
Pegasus HAPS 1996 24 months 710 Pressurant induced
Ariane 1 3rd stage 1986 9 months 492 Propellant induced
Titan Transtage 1965 0 months 473 Propulsion failure
Agena D 1970 6 months 375 Unknown; Propellant induced?
PSLV 4th stage 2001 2 months 371 Propellant induced
Long March 4 3rd stage 2000 5 months 344 Propellant induced
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Spacecraft Fragmentations
• As of 1 January 2013, Russia (including the former USSR) was responsible 
for 51 deliberate spacecraft detonations.
– Anti-satellite tests
– Loss of controlled reentry capability
– Loss of attitude
• Battery failures account for 8 spacecraft breakups (1 U.S.).
• At least three U.S. spacecraft suffered fragmentations during propulsion 
operations:  USA 68, Mars Observer, and CONTOUR.
• 34 events from unknown causes (including 22 of a single Russian satellite 
type).
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Accidental Satellite Collisions
• Four known accidental hypervelocity collisions between cataloged objects.
– 1991:  Cosmos 1934 struck by piece of mission-related debris
– 1996:  CERISE struck by piece of Ariane 1 fragmentation debris
– 2005:  U.S. upper stage struck by piece of Chinese upper stage fragmentation debris
– 2009:  Collision of Iridium 33 and Cosmos 2251 spacecraft
• The first three events created very few debris.  The collision of Iridium 33 
and Cosmos 2251 resulted in more than 2200 large (trackable) debris and 
many more smaller debris.
• A few low velocity collisions have also occurred during operations but have 
resulted in no or few debris, e.g., Progress-M 34 and the Mir Space Station.
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Iridium-Cosmos Collision: Initial Debris Spread
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Iridium-Cosmos Collision: Orbital Planes
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Iridium-Cosmos Collision
• One year after the accidental collision of Iridium 33 and Cosmos 2251, more 
than 2000 large debris had been identified.
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Cosmos 539 Potential Accidental Collision
• Cosmos 539 was nearly 30 years old in 2002 when its orbit was 
perturbed and a new debris piece was generated with high A/M
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Deliberate Satellite Collisions
• Four deliberate hypervelocity satellite collisions have occurred.
– Solwind satellite destroyed in 1985 during test of U.S. anti-satellite device; all debris 
reentered within 19 years.
– USA-19 intentionally collided with orbital stage a few hours after launch in 1986 under 
an experiment by DoD (SDIO);  all cataloged debris reentered in less than one year.
– USA-193 destroyed in 2008 shortly before reentry to prevent risk of human casualty 
from on-board hazardous material; all but one cataloged debris reentered within eight 
months.
– Fengyun-1C destroyed in 2007 during test of Chinese anti-satellite device; nearly 3400 
large debris created; many will be long-lived.
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Debris Distribution from Fengyun-1C
• Fengyun-1C debris is spread across the entire LEO region and beyond.
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New Debris Source Discovered
• During observations of the orbital debris environment in the 1990’s, NASA 
discovered an unexpectedly dense population of small particles in orbits 
near 900-1000 km with 65 degree inclinations.
– 55 objects larger than 5 cm had been officially cataloged by February 2013
– More than 100,000 particles between 5 mm and 5 cm are estimated
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Coolant Release from Nuclear Reactors
• The source of these particles is assessed to be sodium potassium coolant 
from the primary coolant loop of Bouk reactors which ejected their fuel rod 
assemblies, following a redesign after the uncontrolled reentry of Cosmos 
954 in 1978.  At least 14 vehicles have ejected their reactor cores.
• Bouk and Topaz secondary coolant loops are possible future sources of 
sodium potassium droplets from space debris impacts on radiators.
• No coolant particles have yet been observed in the orbital regime of the 
U.S. SNAP-10A reactor (launched in 1965).
Reactor Core (enlarged)
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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Solid Rocket Motor Effluents
• Solid rocket motors eject large quantities of small particles, during burn 
and after shut-down.
• Two size categories:  5-35 microns and 0.1 mm to 5 cm
• The largest, most hazardous particles are released after SRM shut-down.
LDEF gold surface impacted by aluminum oxide SRM particle.
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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Sample SRM Debris Photos
Pegasus SRM 15.5 
sec after shutdown
Space Shuttle SRBs 20.5 
seconds after separation
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Paint Particles
• During inspection of the windows of the Challenger Space Shuttle following 
its STS-7 mission in 1983, a 3-mm-diameter, 0.4-mm-deep crater was 
discovered.  The window pane had to be replaced.
• Examination of residue in the crater indicated that the particle had been a 
fleck of paint.  Hypervelocity paint impacts have commonly been found on 
subsequent Space Shuttle missions.
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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Types of Space Shuttle Windows Impactors
• During 1992-2001 a total of 463 Shuttle window impactors were 
characterized by type.
• Impactors were typically 0.01-0.06 mm in diameter, but some were as 
large as 0.2 mm in diameter.
Orbital Debris
Meteoroids
Aluminum
Stainless Steel
Paint
Other
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Summary (1)
10 m 100 m 10 cm 1 m 10 m1 mm 1 cm
Size (diameter)
S/Cs, R/Bs
Breakup Fragments
Mission-related Debris
Al2O3 (slag)Al2O3
Meteoroids
NaK
Paint Flakes MLI Pieces
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Summary (2)
• Many millions of debris are currently in Earth orbit.
• They range in size from a few microns to tens of meters in length and come 
from a variety of sources.
• They pose a risk to all space operations, both human space flight and 
robotic.
• In general:
– Objects larger than ~5 mm pose mission termination risks.
– Objects smaller than 1 mm pose mission degradation risks.
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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Characterizing the Earth’s 
Satellite Population:
Counting Debris
Orbital Debris Program Office
NASA Johnson Space Center
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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How Much Debris Is There?
Softball or larger (> 10 cm):  20,000+
Marble or larger (> 1 cm):  ~500,000
Dot or larger (> 1 mm):  ~135,000,000
(1/4 the size of a BB)
How do we know this?
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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Orbital Debris Detection Responsibilities 
and Capabilities
• NASA and DoD share responsibility for determining the Earth satellite 
population at various sizes and altitudes.
– DoD is the lead for objects > 10 cm in LEO and > 1 m in GEO
– NASA is the lead for objects < 10 cm in LEO and < 1 m in GEO
• DoD assessments are deterministic, while NASA assessments are primarily 
statistical.
• A wide variety of radars and electro-optical sensors are employed.
• DoD databases are also used for conjunction assessments and collision 
avoidance, while NASA models support probabilistic risk assessments for 
the small debris population.
• NASA also has the lead for predicting the future Earth satellite population.
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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Orbital Debris Detectors and Damage Potential
0.5
1.5
2.5
3.5
4.5
5.5
6.5
0.001 0.01 0.1 1 10 100 1000
Haystack Radar
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Spacecraft 
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Potential Shuttle Damage
Most robotic satellites are vulnerable 
to debris as small as 5 mm.
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U.S. Space Surveillance Network
• The Department of Defense operates the U.S. Space Surveillance Network 
(SSN), which is comprised of radars and electro-optical sensors around the 
world, and maintains the official U.S. Satellite Catalog.
– Objects as small as 5-10 cm in low Earth orbit
– Objects as small as ~1 m in geosynchronous orbit
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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Phased-Array Radars
• SSN phased-array radars operate in UHF (sensitivity to ~ 10 cm and L-band 
(sensitivity to ~ 5 cm) and can easily detect/track multiple objects 
simultaneously.  They primarily observe LEO and near-LEO.
Cobra Dane radar, 
L-band, LEO
PAVE PAWS radar, 
UHF, LEO
Eglin radar, UHF, 
LEO and Deep Space
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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Dish Radars
• SSN dish radar operate at a variety of frequencies from UHF to Ka-band and 
most are capable of detecting objects up to GEO, although sensitivity 
decreases with range.
• Dish radars normally are tasked to track only one object at any time.
ALTAIR radar in 
the Pacific Ocean
Globus II radar in Norway
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
9 Orbital Debris Program Office
VHF Fence Radar (1)
• Three VHF transmitters and six receivers located at approximately 33 N 
latitude across the U.S. constitute a interferometric fence which can detect 
objects ~30 cm and larger passing through.
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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VHF Fence Radar (2)
Jordan Lake Transmitter Red River Receiver
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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Breakdown of Current U.S. Satellite Catalog
As of February 2013
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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Orbital Debris in the 5 mm – 10 cm Range
• NASA and DoD jointly fund observations by the Haystack and Haystack 
Auxiliary (HAX) radars to detect objects as small as 5 mm in LEO.
– NASA analyses the data to develop an environmental model.
Haystack radar, X-band;
narrow field of view;
can detect debris as 
small as 5 mm in LEO
HAX radar, Ka-band;
wider field of view;
can detect debris as 
small as 2 cm in LEO
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JPL Goldstone Radars
• NASA utilizes 70-m dish and 34-m dish radars at JPL Goldstone to detect 
objects as small as 2-3 mm in LEO.
• The two radars operate in a bi-static
mode, i.e., the larger dish (DSS-14) 
transmits in X-band and the smaller 
dish (DSS-15) receives.
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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Optical Detection of Debris in LEO
• From 1994 to 2002 NASA operated CCD Debris Telescope (CDT) and the 
Liquid Mirror Telescope (LMT) to detect cm-class objects in low Earth orbit.
• One objective was to compare debris radar visibility with optical visibility.
• During the last several years, both telescopes were operated at an 
observatory at Cloudcroft, NM.
Liquid Mirror Telescope
CCD Debris Telescope
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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Former Cloudcroft Telescopes
CCD Debris Telescope Liquid Mirror Telescope, 
3-meter diameter
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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Radar-Optical Model Agreement
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Debris in Geosynchronous Orbits
• For observations of geosynchronous debris (>30 cm), NASA works with a 
University of Michigan telescope in Chile:  the Michigan Orbital Debris 
Survey Telescope (MODEST).
• A nearby telescope is 
sometimes used to obtain
additional track data. MODEST
0.9 
m
Stars are streaks; 
satellites are dots or ovals
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Uncataloged Debris near GEO
• MODEST has detected a significant population of uncataloged debris near 
GEO.
CT = Cataloged
UCT = Uncataloged
Diagonal line indicates 
fragment distribution 
from typical explosion
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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Meter-Class Autonomous Telescope (MCAT)
• NASA is currently working 
with the Department of 
Defense to deploy a new 1.3-m 
telescope on Ascension Island 
in the Atlantic Ocean.
• The low latitude of the site will 
permit observations of low 
inclination debris at all 
altitudes.
– Debris as small as 10 cm in 
GEO should be detectable.
• The telescope will be operated 
remotely from JSC.
• Operations will start in 2014.
The MCAT telescope and 
mount will be non-traditional.
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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Sub-Millimeter Orbital Debris
• Sub-millimeter debris cannot be easily detected with terrestrial sensors.
• NASA examines the surfaces of objects returned from space to discern the 
population of sub-millimeter debris.
– Examination of the Space Shuttle after every flight.
– Examination of materials returned from the International Space Station, the Hubble 
Space Telescope and other robotic spacecraft.
• The Long-Duration Exposure Facility (LDEF) [1984-1990] provided the first 
detailed assessment of small particle debris in low Earth orbit.
LDEF Panel from LDEF
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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The Hubble Space Telescope as a Witness Plate
• During each HST servicing mission a photographic survey is conducted to 
detect the effects of small particle impacts.
• Solar arrays have also been returned to Earth for careful examination of 
impact features.
Photo from HST 
Servicing Mission 
3A (Dec 1999).
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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Latest Inspection of the HST Components
• In May 2009, Space Shuttle Atlantis 
visited and successfully 
refurbished the Hubble Space 
Telescope.
• The Wide Field Planetary Camera 2 
was removed and returned to Earth 
after 16 years in space.
• Numerous large impact features 
(green circles) had occurred since 
the last servicing mission in 2002 
(red circles).
• Microscopic examinations have 
revealed nearly 700 hypervelocity 
impact features greater than 0.3 
mm in diameter. WFPC2 Radiator (2.2 m long, 0.8 m tall)
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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Inspection Instruments
• Keyence VHX-600 digital microscope (up to 5000x optical, 2D and 3D)
– Records each impact feature’s shape, size, depth, and volume
• LAP CAD-Pro laser template projector
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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Measuring Large Craters
Two Depths:
– Central crater depth
– Paint thickness
Four Diameters:
– Spallation
– Bare metal
– “Burned” metal
– Lips or center
Results
Inputs
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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Measuring Small Craters
One Depth:
– Central crater depth
Two Diameters:
– Spallation
– Center
Results
Inputs
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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Human Space Flight Regime Flux
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Growth of the Cataloged Satellite Population:  
Mass of Objects
• Recently, the rate of mass growth in low Earth orbit has averaged nearly 
200 metric tons per year.   Only ~40% of the mass is in LEO.
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Launch Rate is Not a Useful Parameter for 
Judging Growth of the Satellite Population
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LEO Spatial Density
• One of the primary parameters of interest is spatial density, i.e., the number 
of objects per unit volume (typically per km3).
• The graphic below indicated the serious effect of the Chinese ASAT test in 
January 2007 on the cataloged satellite population.  It does not reflect the 
US-Russian satellite collision in Feb 2009 (next page).
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More Current LEO Spatial Density
• The collision of the Iridium 33 and Cosmos 2251 satellites significantly 
altered the amount and distribution of orbital debris in LEO.
Cataloged objects only; 
as of January 2013
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Spatial Densities Through GEO
• Spatial densities in general decrease above LEO with higher concentrations 
near semi-synchronous and geosynchronous altitudes.
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Orbits of MEO Navigation Spacecraft (July 2010)
18000
19000
20000
21000
22000
23000
24000
10000 15000 20000 25000 30000 35000 40000
Apogee
Perigee
GIOVE
Beidou
GLONASS
U.S. SSN Satellite Number
A
l
t
i
t
u
d
e
(
k
m
)
GPS
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
35 Orbital Debris Program Office
GEO Spatial Densities
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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Summary
• Using a wide variety of sensors and techniques, NASA has characterized 
the orbital debris environment for sizes from tens of microns to tens of 
meters.
• The orbital debris environment is highly dynamic due to space activity, 
satellite fragmentations and degradations, and solar effects.  
• Consequently, the environment must be monitored on a continuing basis 
and models of the environment must  be periodically revised.
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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Characterizing the Earth’s 
Satellite Population:
An Overview of NASA’s Orbital 
Debris Engineering Model
Orbital Debris Program Office
NASA Johnson Space Center
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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Orbital Debris Engineering Models
• Orbital debris engineering models are mathematical tools to assess orbital 
debris flux
– Created primarily for spacecraft designers to accurately assess spacecraft 
risk
– Also have been used historically to estimate sensor flux (e.g., predicted 
counts in a radar beam)
• Need to be updated periodically
– Changes in the environment
– New data
– New techniques
– Need for expanded capabilities
• For vehicle design and operational requirements, orbital debris engineering 
models must also predict the environment a decade or two into the future.
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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NASA Orbital Debris Engineering Model History
• Prior to 1994 the NASA orbital debris engineering model (ORDEM) 
consisted of a simple flux curve based mostly on analytical model results.
• The 1994 ORDEM for Space Station Freedom and ORDEM96 used new 
Haystack data to describe 1 cm – 10 cm regime accurately for the first time.
– Finite inclination and eccentricity bands still described by analytic formulae.
• ORDEM2000 used new techniques and computer improvements to describe 
complicated orbit distributions.
– ORDEM now primarily empirical.
– Populations saved as digital ensembles rather than analytic functions.
• All ORDEM versions through ORDEM2000 were applicable only for low 
Earth orbits.
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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ORDEM 3.0 New Features
• Environment is expanded past LEO.
– Includes data for objects in MEO and GEO
– Elliptical spacecraft orbits handled explicitly
• Orbital debris flux uncertainties provided for the first time.
– Primarily uncertainties in population estimates
– Need to propagate to final flux values
• Material density types have been introduced.
– Material densities influence damage equations
• Debris shape was analyzed carefully but is not explicitly included in the 
model.  At critical sizes, shape variation is normally limited.
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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ORDEM 3.0 Supporting Data
• The ORDEM series derived environments are based on analysis of existing 
data available at the time of development of each version. 
• The Chinese ASAT test (2007) and Iridium-Cosmos collision (2009) cloud 
populations have been explicitly added based on empirical radar data 
analysis and modeling of future cloud evolution.
Observational Data Role Region/Size
SSN catalog (radars+ telescopes) Intacts & large fragments LEO > 10cm, GEO > 70cm
Special Cobra Dane observations 
(radar)
Compare with SSN LEO > 4 cm
Haystack  (radar) Statistical populations LEO > 1cm 
Goldstone (radar) Compare with Haystack LEO >2 mm
STS windows and radiators 
(returned surfaces)
Statistical populations LEO < 1mm
HST solar panels (returned 
surfaces)
Compare with STS LEO < 1mm
MODEST (telescope) Only sub-meter GEO data 
set
GEO > 30cm
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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ORDEM2000 vs. ORDEM 3.0
Parameter ORDEM2000 ORDEM 3.0
Spacecraft and Telescope/Radar analysis modes YES YES
Time range 1991 to 2030 1995 to 2035
Altitude range with minimum debris size 200 to 2000 km (>10 m) 200 to >34,000 km (>10 m)*
34,000 to 38,000 km (>10 cm)
Model population breakdown NO Low-density fragments 
Medium-density fragments and degradation/ejecta 
High-density fragments and degradation/ejecta
RORSAT NaK coolant droplets
Material density breakdown NO low-density (<2 g/cc)
medium-density (2-6 g/cc)
high-density (>6 g/cc) 
RORSAT NaK coolant (0.9 g/cc)
Model cumulative size thresholds 10 m, 100 m,  1mm,
1 cm , 10 cm, 1 m 
10 m, 31.6 m,  100 m, 316 m, 1mm, 3.16 mm,
1 cm, 3.16 cm, 10 cm, 31.6 cm, 1 m 
Population uncertainties NO YES
Total input file size 13.5 MB 128 MB
Meteoroids NO NO
* Sub-millimeter population has been validated for LEO only
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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Haystack Data
• A statistical method is used to adjust population parameters so that the 
predicted pattern of data (in this case range and Doppler range-rate) best 
matches the data.  Uncertainties are a by-product of this analysis.
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Space Object Distributions
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Future Populations
• ORDEM 3.0 populations are projected out to 2035.
• Future populations based on LEGEND model runs using nominal 
assumptions for breakup rates, launch rates, and solar activity.
• 100 Monte Carlo runs executed by LEGEND.
– Mean represents “average” future
– Spread in results represents range of possible futures, treated as 
uncertainty value
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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ORDEM 3.0 GUI
Primary inputs:  
Year of interest
Perigee and Apogee
Inclination
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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Orbit:  800 km, 83 deg; Year = 2020
(Source:  ORDEM 3.0)
Notional Data – Not Yet Certified
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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Orbit:  800 km, 83 deg; Year = 2020
(Source:  ORDEM 3.0)
Notional Data – Not Yet Certified
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Orbit:  400 km, 51.6 deg; Year = 2020
(Source:  ORDEM 3.0)
Notional Data – Not Yet Certified
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Orbit:  800 km, 83 deg; Year = 2020
(Source:  ORDEM 3.0)
Notional Data – Not Yet Certified
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Orbit:  400 km, 51.6 deg; Year = 2020
(Source:  ORDEM 3.0)
Notional Data – Not Yet Certified
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Orbit:  800 km, 83 deg; Year = 2020
(Source:  ORDEM 3.0)
Notional Data – Not Yet Certified
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Summary
• ORDEM 3.0 represents the latest generation of orbital debris engineering 
models
• New features:
– Extension beyond LEO
– Full directionality for spacecraft flux
– Material density breakdowns
– Uncertainties in flux calculations computed
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Probability and Consequences 
of Collisions
Orbital Debris Program Office
NASA Johnson Space Center
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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Collision Risk as a Function of Debris Size
• Simplistic probability of collision:
– Pc for a given vehicle = (orbital debris flux) x (cross-sectional area) x (time) = FAT 
or = (average collision velocity) x (cross-sectional area) x (spatial density) x (time) =VAST
• Collisions with debris are a concern for two reasons:
– success of the space mission
– protection of the near-Earth space environment for future missions
• Consequences of collisions with debris can be categorized by size*:
(* collisions with vehicle main body, rather than appendages)
Debris Size Loss of Mission Environmental Effect Likelihood of Occurrence
< 1 mm Unlikely None Most likely
1 mm - 1 cm Possible Very limited
1 - 10 cm Likely Limited
> 10 cm Highly likely Potentially significant Least likely
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
3 Orbital Debris Program Office
Collision Risk Spectrum and Countermeasures
Orbital Debris Environment
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Collision Avoidance for Human Spaceflight
• A process to avoid collisions with tracked space objects (i.e., > 10 cm)  was 
implemented with STS-26 in 1988.
– The approach of another object within a box 4 km X 10 km X 4 km centered on the 
Space Shuttle represented a collision risk on the order of 1 in 100,000 and was 
grounds to execute a collision avoidance maneuver
• With the launch of the first module of the International Space Station in 
1998, a new, higher fidelity, probability-based collision avoidance process 
was implemented.
– If collision risk is > 1 in 100,000, a collision avoidance maneuver would be performed, if 
it did not compromise mission objectives (yellow threshold)
– If collision risk is > 1 in 10,000, a collision avoidance maneuver would be performed 
(red threshold).
• Historically, the rate of collision avoidance maneuvers has been less than 
one per year for both the Space Shuttle and the ISS.
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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ISS Conjunction Assessment Process
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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Sample ISS Conjunction:  19 September 2009
• Conjuncting object:  Satellite Number 35438 (Cosmos 2251 debris)
• Late notification; planned maneuver was cancelled.
OCM # UPDATE 
TIME
(GMT)
TCA
(GMT)
U
[Radial]
(KM)
V
[Down 
Track]
(KM)
W
[Cross 
Track]
(KM)
R
[Spacing]
(KM)
TIME
TO TCA
(HRS)
Pc
1 09/18/09 04:57
09/19/09 
17:27:56.65
4
-0.512 21.419 18.552 28.340 36.5 NC
2 09/18/09 09:22
09/19/09 
17:27:57.64
8
-0.471 15.655 13.556 20.713 32.1 NC
3 09/18/09 13:38
09/19/09 
17:27:58.11
5
-0.244 7.656 6.633 10.132 28.8 1.47E-04
Red
4 09/18/09 19:43
09/19/09 
17:27:58.22
6
-0.229 6.701 5.806 8.869 21.7 2.59E-5
Yellow 
5 09/18/09 01:10
09/19/09 
17:27:58.37
7
-0.240 6.709 5.810 8.878 16.3 5.5E-6
Green
6 09/19/09 05:49
09/19/09 
17:27:58.52
9
-0.215 5.528 4.784 7.313 11.7 8.28E-06Green
7 09/19/09 08:39
09/19/09 
17:27:58.62
8
-0.203 4.923 4.264 6.516 8.8 7.23E-21Green
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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ISS Collision Avoidance Maneuver in 2010
• After a 14-year mission, NASA’s Upper 
Atmospheric Research Satellite (UARS) was 
decommissioned in late 2005 and maneuvered 
into a lower altitude disposal orbit from which 
reentry will occur during 2011.
• In September 2010, a small fragment 
unexpectedly separated from UARS.
• Although the fragment remained in orbit only six 
weeks, the object was predicted to pass close by 
the International Space Station on 26 October, 
posing a collision threat of greater than 1 in 
10,000.
• Using the Progress M-07M logistics vehicle, 
a small collision avoidance maneuver (+0.4 m/s) 
was conducted a little more than two hours 
before the predicted time of closest approach.
UARS being deployed by Space 
Shuttle Discovery in 1991.
International Space Station
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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Robotic Spacecraft Collision Avoidance
• In 2004, in response to the growing debris risk, NASA GSFC implemented a 
process for providing routine collision avoidance operations to protect the 
Earth Science Constellations.
– The missions are managed independently by several different NASA centers as well as 
International Partners, but the mission operators work together to ensure the health 
and safety of the constellations.
– NASA JSC provided assistance in establishing the robotic process, which needed to be 
somewhat different from the manned process due to the different orbit regimes and 
different operations processes.
• In August 2007, because of the increasing threat posed by orbital debris, 
NASA established a policy that requires routine collision avoidance 
operations for robotic assets that have maneuvering capability.
• In April 2009, the policy was expanded to require routine conjunction 
analysis for non-maneuverable and non-operational NASA assets in 
addition to the maneuverable assets.
– Therefore, the NASA Robotic Conjunction Assessment process has expanded and is 
currently being used to support ~65 spacecraft in a variety of orbit regimes.
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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Robotic Collision Avoidance Maneuvers
• Frequent conjunction assessments are required for all maneuverable NASA 
spacecraft in LEO and GEO.  Collision avoidance maneuvers are conducted 
when established probability of collision thresholds are reached.
NASA, USGS, and NOAA Robotic Satellite 
Collision Avoidance Maneuvers in 2012
Mean Altitude Spacecraft Object Avoided Maneuver Date
550 km GLAST  (2008-029A) Cosmos 1805 3 April 2012      
700 km AURA  (2004-026A) Cosmos 2251 Debris 17 May 2012      
CALIPSO  (2006-016B) Cosmos 2251 Debris 2 October 2012      
CLOUDSAT  (2006-016A) Sinah 1 8 September 2012      
LANDSAT 5  (1984-021A) Agena D stage Debris 1 July 2012      
LANDSAT 7  (1999-020A) Fengyun-1C Debris 9 March 2012      
Meteor 1-10 Debris 17 April 2012      
825 km NPP  (2011-061A) Agena D stage Debris 1 February 2012      
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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Known Accidental Hypervelocity Collisions
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Subscale Hypervelocity Impact Tests, 
1970’s-1980’s
• During the late 1970’s and early 1980’s, a series of hypervelocity impact tests 
were conducted using large targets representative of subscale satellites.
– Target masses:  ~ 26 kg
– Projectile masses:  80-240 gm
– Impact velocities:  up to 6 km/s
– Pressurized and unpressurized targets
– Normal and oblique impact angles
• Examination of debris sizes and velocities resulted in first satellite collision 
fragmentation models.
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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Broadside Impact (1)
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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Broadside Impact (2)
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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Broadside Impact (3)
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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Oblique Impact
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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Satellite Orbital Debris Characterization 
Impact Test  (SOCIT)
Date:  10 January 1992 at the Arnold 
Engineering Development Center, 
Tullahoma, TN
Subject:  U.S. Navy Transit satellite Oscar 
22 (NNS 30220)
Test Objective:  Simulate the collision of a 
5-cm piece of orbital debris on a 
functional satellite and characterize the 
resultant debris in terms of number, mass, 
velocity, shape, and composition.
Test Condition:  Satellite (sans solar 
arrays) was struck with a 150 gm 
projective traveling at 6 km per second.
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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Transit Oscar 22 prior to SOCIT (1)
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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Transit Oscar 22 prior to SOCIT (2)
Transit Oscar with outer 
phenolic skin removed
Transit Oscar mounted in test chamber
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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Transit Oscar 22 Test Chamber:  Before and After
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
20 Orbital Debris Program Office
Spacecraft Collision Risks from Breakup Debris
• Orbital debris risks to spacecraft:
– Orbital debris left over from >50 years of space activity distributed over a 
variety of orbits – contribute to “background” risk.
• Large objects (> 5-10 cm) are tracked by the SSN.
 DoD routinely computes collision risks with these objects for NASA
• Risks from objects too small to be tracked are typically handled in a 
statistical manner using spacecraft shielding and orientation. 
 Directionality, size distributions, and velocity distributions described by ORDEM 
models
– New breakups can temporarily enhance this collision risk.
• Space asset may fly through region of debris enhancement.
• Debris cloud is dynamic, and collision risk depends on details of debris 
cloud and asset orbit.
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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Even Small Debris Can be Hazardous
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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Satellite Breakup Risk Assessment 
Model (SBRAM)
• SBRAM was developed by NASA Orbital Debris Program Office to assess in 
real-time elevated collision risks to high value NASA assets (especially 
Space Shuttle and ISS) following new satellite breakups.
- NASA/JSC is informed 24/7 by DoD’s Joint Space Operations Center 
(JSpOC) whenever a new satellite breakup is detected.
• SBRAM uses NASA Standard Breakup Model (developed to describe near-
and long-term evolution of debris environment) to create a Monte Carlo 
cloud:
– Size distribution
– Ballistic coefficient distribution
– Delta-velocity distribution
• Various orbit propagation techniques are employed to model future TLEs 
(two-line element sets) for Monte Carlo debris cloud particles.
– Atmospheric drag; solar/lunar perturbations; J2, J3; solar radiation pressure
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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Satellite Breakup Risk Assessment 
Model (SBRAM)
• Conjunctions of space asset with cloud particles are computed to integrate 
risk.
• Debris-Asset conjunctions are tabulated. 
– Timing
– Directionality
– Impact probability
• The procedure is repeated and results are integrated using Monte Carlo 
approach until desired accuracies are obtained.
• Output results:
– Estimated cumulative risk to asset
– Estimation of risk each time the asset encounters the cloud
– Times and conditions of highest risk
– Directionality of highest risk
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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Initial Screen for SBRAM
Primary inputs:  
Recent TLEs of breakup object and spacecraft of concern
Type of object which broke-up (spacecraft or rocket body)
Known or estimated date/time of breakup 
Scaling factor (if necessary)
Number of Monte Carlo iterations
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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Sample Rev by Rev Risk Assessment
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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Sample Cumulative Risk Ouput
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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Detailed Impact Risk Assessment Process
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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Surface Coating Damage
Carbon Substrate Penetration
Rear-Side Spall Complete Penetration
K.E. = 0.5 J
K.E. = 4 to 7 J K.E. = 30 to 50 J
Reinforced Carbon-Carbon (RCC) Damage Modes
P = 0.61 d (V cos2/3 (p / t)0.5
( V cos 2/3 ( p / t )0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
0 1 2 3 4 5
Surface Coating
Damage
CC Penetration
Rear-Side Spall
Least-Squares Fit
RCC Penetration depth P = 0.61 d (V cos)2/3 (p/t)0.5
Thickness to Prevent Complete Penetration tp = 2.3 * P
Thickness to Prevent Rear-Side Spall ts = 4.5 * P
0.24mm diameter Al @ 7km/s, 0o
0.6mm diameter Al @ 7km/s, 0o 1.0mm diameter Al @ 7km/s, 0o
1” Hole
K.E. = 3700 J
4.8mm diameter Al @ 7km/s, 0o
Example HVI Results:  Space Shuttle
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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Shuttle Vulnerabilities by Vehicle Attitude
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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Sample Shuttle MMOD Risk Assessment:  STS-119
• Assessment conditions:
– Attitude Time-Line: 14 day mission, 119FIN (issued 1/23/09) - 02/12/09 liftoff
• Includes 54 hours in ISS +XVV attitude (high MMOD risk attitude) for S6 thermal 
– Late Inspection: FD13 wing leading edge and nose cap, discern damages >0.35” 
diameter (WLE 90% success rate, NC 99.9% success rate)
– MMOD damage repair & LON: Included effectiveness WLE/NC damage repair (NOAX 
and plug) & LON (Launch on Need) success rate (90% combined effectiveness)
– Damage Allowables: No change since STS-126 for damage causing loss-of-crew & 
vehicle (LOCV)
– Meteor showers & Orbital Debris breakups: No major meteor showers, Orbital 
debris breakups include COSMOS 2421 (triple breakup over March-June 2008)
• Debris breakups increase MMOD risk by less than 2%
• MMOD Risk for LOCV damage: 
– 1 in 216 (with late inspection, and 90% repair/LON effectiveness)
• With FD2 inspection: 1 in 135
• No FD2 or late inspection: 1 in 131
• MMOD risk for radiator tube leak: 1 in 76; predicted window replacements: 4
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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Sample EVA MMOD Risk Assessment:  STS-119
• Cumulative MMOD risk for 4 EVAs & for two levels of damage assessed 
using Bumper code. 
– Normal meteor shower activity included (minimal activity for Feb 2009)
– Orbital debris breakups included (COSMOS 2421 triple breakup over March-June 2008) 
– Risk increases ~4% (due to orbital debris breakups)
- 1 in 2,000 for any size leak 
- 1 in 6,600 for catastrophic impact
(4mm or larger hole in bladder is catastrophic)
• STS-119 EVA MMOD risk is 1/3rd of assessed MMOD risk for STS-125 HST-
SM4 EVAs.
total EVA 
duration (hr)
duration 
exposed to 
MMOD (hr) Total EV1 EV2 EV3 Total EV1 EV2 EV3
EVA1 (FD5) 6.58 6.42 1 in 7,800 1 in 15,100 1 in 16,000 na 1 in 26,100 1 in 50,700 1 in 53,700 na
EVA2 (FD7) 6.75 6.58 1 in 7,500 1 in 14,800 na 1 in 15,100 1 in 25,000 1 in 49,600 na 1 in 50,500
EVA3 (FD9) 5.92 5.75 1 in 7,700 na 1 in 14,900 1 in 15,900 1 in 25,700 na 1 in 49,800 1 in 53,200
EVA4 (FD11) 6.33 6.17 1 in 8,600 1 in 16,400 1 in 18,000 na 1 in 28,700 1 in 54,800 1 in 60,300 na
Total 25.58 24.92 1 in 2,000 1 in 5,100 1 in 5,400 1 in 7,700 1 in 6,600 1 in 17,200 1 in 18,100 1 in 25,900
Summary
Results from STS-119 EVA Timeline Analysis - 2/12/09 Launch
Penetration Odds (leak risk) Catastrophic Odds (uncontrolled leak)
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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STS-128 Radiator Impact
• An impact occurred directly center on a doubler, which protects the 
radiator flow tubes from MMOD
– Impact crater penetrated through the thermal tape, completely through the 0.02” thick 
doubler, and damaged the facesheet below the doubler
– Analysis indicates the same impact would have penetrated the flow tube if the doublers 
were not present
– Doublers added in 1997-1999 time period, to provide additional protection for ISS missions
– Conclusion: Doublers performed as designed/expected preventing a radiator tube puncture
MMOD impact into Radiator LH1 doubler 
protecting flow-tubes
Crater diameter = 0.8 mm
Crater depth = 0.58 mm 
Doubler thickness = 0.51 mm
Simulation of impact after 2 
micro-seconds with doubler: 
crater through thermal tape 
(green) and penetration nearly 
through doubler (red)…i.e., 
similar to actual damage.
Simulation of same impact after 2 
micro-seconds without doubler: 
crater through thermal tape 
(green), through facesheet 
(yellow) and through flow tube 
wall (blue)…i.e., leak would have 
occurred without doubler.
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Whipple and Stuffed Whipple Shields
• A Whipple shield is a single, thin 
plate (bumper) used to break-up a 
high velocity particle before it 
strikes a critical spacecraft surface.
• Originally, designed for the 
meteoroid environment.
• A stuffed-Whipple shield employs 
additional sheets of material to 
further absorb the energy of the 
fragmenting particle.
• Common interior materials are 
Kevlar and Nextel.
Whipple shield (right) and 
stuffed-Whipple shield (left).
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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Protecting the International Space Station
• The International Space Station is the most heavily 
protected space vehicle with more than 200 different 
types of shields to mitigate the effects of small particle 
hypervelocity impacts.
JAXA ESA
Sample ISS Stuffed Whipple Shields
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National Aeronautics and Space Administration
37 Orbital Debris Program Office
Advanced Orbital Debris Shielding Designs
• Aluminum honeycomb and metallic foam Whipple shield fillers can provide 
even greater protection from hypervelocity particle impacts while also 
reducing total shield mass.
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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Future Growth of the 
Orbital Debris Environment
Orbital Debris Program Office
NASA Johnson Space Center
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Instability of the Current LEO Populations
(no new launches beyond 2006)
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• “The current debris population in the LEO region has reached the point 
where the environment is unstable and collisions will become the most 
dominant debris-generating mechanism in the future” 
– Liou and Johnson, Science, 20 January 2006
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Revised Projection in 2009
• The effects of the Chinese ASAT test in 2007 and the collision of Iridium 33 
and Cosmos 2251 in early 2009 made matters much worse.
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Future Environment Modeling Objectives
• Evaluate the future debris population growth in the low Earth orbit 
(LEO) region under specified scenarios.
• Demonstrate the effectiveness of the commonly-adopted mitigation 
measures and active debris removal.
• Quantify the relative benefits of active debris removal in LEO to future 
space systems.
5National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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Tool for the Study - LEGEND
• LEGEND, a LEO-to-GEO Environment Debris model, is a high fidelity 3-D 
model developed by the NASA Orbital Debris Program Office
– Uses a deterministic approach to simulate the historical debris environment 
based on recorded launches and breakups
– Uses a Monte Carlo approach and a reliable collision probability evaluation 
algorithm to simulate the future debris populations
– Future debris environment is analyzed based on specified traffic cycle, 
postmission disposal, and active debris removal options
• References in peer-reviewed journals:
– Liou, J.-C., et al., Adv. Space Res. 34, 2004.
– Liou, J.-C., Adv. Space Res. 38, 2006.
– Liou, J.-C. and Johnson, N.L., Science 311, 2006.
– Liou, J.-C., Acta Astronautica 62, 2008.
– Liou, J.-C. and Johnson, N.L., Acta Astronautica 64, 2009.
– Liou, J.-C., et al., Acta Astronautica, 66, 2010.
6National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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Study Scenario Types
• Non-Mitigation (NoM):
- 1957 to 2009 + 100 years future projection
• Post-Mission Disposal (PMD):
- Move rocket bodies (R/Bs) to 25-year decay orbits or above-LEO collection orbits   
(depending on V requirement) after launch
- Move spacecraft (S/C) to 25-year decay orbits or above-LEO collection orbits 
(depending on V requirement) after 8 years of mission lifetime
- Set postmission disposal success rate to 90%
• Active Debris Removal (ADR):
- Start active removal in 2020
- Remove objects with the greatest [ mass  Pc ] product, where Pc is the instantaneous   
collision probability at the beginning of the year
7National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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Scenarios Examined
• Eight scenarios were completed for the study:
 NoM
 NoM + ADR02
 NoM + ADR05
 NoM + ADR10
 PMD
 PMD + ADR02
 PMD + ADR05
 PMD + ADR10
• Evaluated 5 mm, 1 cm, and 10 cm populations.
ADR02 =  2 objects removed annually
ADR05 =  5 objects removed annually
ADR10 = 10 objects removed annually
8National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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Post-Mission Disposal Only
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Active Debris Removal with PMD
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Collected Scenarios
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0.E+00
2.E‐08
4.E‐08
6.E‐08
8.E‐08
1.E‐07
200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600 1800 2000
S
p
a
t
i
a
l
 
D
e
n
s
i
t
y
 
(
n
o
/
k
m
3
)
Altitude (km)
Non‐Mitigation, objects ≥10 cm
2108
2058
2008
13
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Orbital Debris Program Office
Spatial Density with ADR05 + PMD
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General Summary of Analysis
• The resident space object population only remains stable with either 
scenario PMD + ADR05 or PDM + ADR10 for all three size regimes 
examined.
– The rate of population growth is non-linear for all other scenarios.
• With no mitigation and no active debris removal, the resident space object 
population increases by a factor of 2 - 2.2 for all size regimes over the 
simulated period.
• The principal risk to operational space systems arises from the population 
of particles 5 mm or greater, which is two orders of magnitude greater than 
the cataloged (> 10 cm) population.
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Space Object Removal
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Debris Removal Concept Principles
• Must be technically feasible in the near-term.
• Must be economically viable.
– Affordable
– Acceptable cost-benefit ratio
• Must result in a meaningful improvement of the current or future near-Earth 
space environment.
17
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Debris Removal Categories
• Debris removal concepts are often categorized by 
– The size of the debris to be removed:  typically < or > 10 cm 
(statistical or designated removal)
– The altitude regime of removal:  LEO, MEO, or GEO
– The basing of the removal device:  ground-based, air-based, or space-based
• Removal of small debris normally affects the near-term environment by 
reducing collision probabilities for existing space systems, e.g., cleansing 
human space flight altitude regimes.
• Removal of large debris influences the mid-term and far-term environments 
by reducing the number of debris-generating collisions.
18
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Orbital Debris Program Office
Sample of Debris Removal Concepts
Debris Removal Technique Altitude Regime Debris Size Regime
Ground-based Laser/Directed Energy LEO < 10 cm
Airborne Laser/Directed Energy LEO < 10 cm
Space-based Laser/Directed Energy LEO, MEO, GEO < 10 cm
Space-based Magnetic Field Generator LEO < 10 cm
Drag Augmentation Device LEO > 10 cm
Solar Sail LEO, MEO, GEO > 1 m
Magnetic Sail LEO, MEO, GEO > 1m
Momentum Tethers LEO, GEO > 10 cm
Electrodynamic Tethers LEO > 10 cm
Capture/Orbital Transfer Vehicle LEO, MEO, GEO > 1 m
Attachable Deorbit/Reorbit Module LEO, MEO, GEO > 1 m
Sweeping/Retarding Surface (balloon, film, foam ball, etc.) LEO < 10 cm
19
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Mass Removal through Conductive Tethers
• Principle  attach a conductive tether & end-mass to a target object; deploy the 
tether to de-orbit the target via a retarding Lorentz force
• Pro  effective for large de-orbit masses within LEO
• Con  complex and costly launch, rendezvous, attachment, and deployment 
operations; tethers are vulnerable to space debris and other resident space 
objects, including operational satellites.
source: JAXAsource: JAXAsource: JAXA
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Mass Removal through Momentum Tethers
• Principle  dynamic relase (allow in-plane tether oscillation; cut tether at lowest 
point during swing-back); static release (maintain tether near local vertical; cut 
tether at termination altitude) ; more de-orbit ∆V obtained for dynamic release; the 
active spacecraft could be a sufficiently sized vehicle
• Pro  potentially effective for large de-orbit masses
• Con  complex and costly launch, rendezvous, attachment, and deployment 
operations; significant tether loads
21
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Mass Removal through Space Tugs
• Principle  deploy a tethered capture device (net or grapple fixture); move the 
compound to a disposal orbit; cut tethered attachment; perform the next 
rendezvous with another GEO object (ROGER concept)
• Pro  effective for large (GEO) objects; multi-target capability
• Con  complex and costly launch, rendezvous, and capture operations; potential 
limitations for non-GEO orbits and for rotating or tumbling target objects
source: EADS
22
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Mass Removal through Drag Augmentation
• Principle  deploy a drag augmentation device to increase aerodynamic cross-
section, reducing the orbit lifetime; orbit lifetime scales linearly with Ao /(Ao+ Aaug)
• Pro  potentially low mass, low-cost system; can be part of the spacecraft design 
for new spacecraft and launch vehicle stages
• Con  collision cross-section scales linearly with (Ao+ Aaug)/Ao; efficiency 
decreases exponentially with increasing orbit altitude;  complex and costly launch, 
rendezvous, and attachment operations for existing resident space objects
23
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Mass Removal through Solar Sails
• Principle  deploy a solar sail (or reflective balloon) to combine effects of 
radiation pressure & aerodynamic drag, reducing the orbit lifetime
• Pro  potentially low-mass, low-cost system; can be part of the spacecraft 
design for new spacecraft and launch vehicle stages; could be applicable at 
altitudes higher than drag augmentation alone
• Con  collision cross-section scales linearly with (Ao+ Asol)/Ao ; complex and 
costly launch, rendezvous, and attachment operations for existing resident 
space objects; requires controlled attitude for greatest efficiency
24
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Mass Removal through Laser Technologies
• Principle  lock on to an orbital debris with ground-, air-, or space-based lasers; 
vaporize the target or parts thereof to cause a thrust to change the orbit and reduce 
its lifetime
• Pro  potentially could remove a large number of small debris
• Con  issues of arms control (for ground- and air-based lasers) and UN treaties (for 
space-based lasers); requirements on pointing accuracy and lock-on control; power 
demands (for air-/space-based) and atmospheric attenuation (for ground-based); 
debris size limitations
AcquisitionIrradiation
Debris Trajectory
Hand-off
Ground-based Laser Acquisition Radar
acquisition
radar
ground-based
laser
hand-over
space-based laser
source: Martin-Marietta
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Other Sample Debris RemediationTechniques
• Solid rocket propulsion modules:
– Principle  attach in rendezvous operation; use for spin-up and de-orbit or re-orbit of 
the target object
– Pro  good fuel efficiency and system robustness; large ∆V
– Con  complex and costly launch and rendezvous; problems of mounting the 
module on unprepared targets; line of thrust
• Magnetic sails:
– Principle  attach in rendezvous operation; deploy as a loop of super-conducting 
material; the magnetic field created by a current interacts with the solar wind, 
producing a ∆V ~ area  current 
– Pro  simple design; efficient also at high altitudes
– Con  complex and costly launch , rendezvous and attachment operations; needs 
electric power supply; efficiency decreases with 1/r4
• Sweeping/momentum retarding surfaces:
– Principle  induce a -∆V on an impacting debris object, causing a loss of orbital 
energy and orbit lifetime reduction
– Pro  simple principle
– Con  costly launch; requires large cross-section to be effective; risk of collision 
with large resident space objects
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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National and International 
Orbital Debris Mitigation 
Policies and Guidelines
Orbital Debris Program Office
NASA Johnson Space Center
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Overview
• Overview of NASA HQ OD Mitigation Documents
• U.S. National Policies and Regulations
• Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee (IADC)
• United Nations
• Foreign National Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines
• European Code of Conduct for Space Debris Mitigation
• International Academy of Astronautics (IAA)
• International Standards Organization (ISO)
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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Evolution of U.S. and NASA Orbital Debris 
Mitigation Policies and Requirements
U.S. Orbital Debris Mitigation
Policy and Standard Practices
NASA Debris Mitigation
Policy and Requirements   
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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NASA Policy for Limiting Orbital Debris Generation
• The first NASA HQ guidance on orbital debris mitigation was issued as 
NASA Management Instruction 1700.8  (5 Apr 1993).
• NASA Policy Directive 8710.3 superseded NMI 1700.8 in May 1997.
• NASA Procedural Requirements 8715.6 superseded NPD 8710.3 in August 
2007; current version is NPR 8715.6A (14 May 2009) and it requires each 
program/project to:
– Prepare formal orbital debris mitigation assessments and end-of-mission plans at 
specified milestones
– Design for safe disposal of spacecraft and launch vehicles at end of mission
– Promote the adoption of international policies, standards, and practices to minimize OD 
and its associated risks, and the exchange of information on OD research, modeling, 
and mitigation techniques in the international community
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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NASA Orbital Debris Mitigation Requirements
• NASA Safety Standard 1740.14 (1 August 1995) established the first detailed 
set of orbital debris mitigation guidelines for each NASA program and 
project.
• NSS 1740.14 was superseded by NASA Technical Standard 8719.14 in 
August 2007 to accompany new NPR 8715.6.  Current version is NS 
8719.14A (8 December 2011).
• Each space mission must assess its compliance with requirements in the 
following areas:
– Release of debris during normal mission operations
– Accidental explosions
– Intentional breakups
– Collisions with small and large objects
– Postmission disposal
– Reentry risks
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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U.S Government Policy and Strategy
U.S. National 
Space Policy
1988 - Present
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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U.S. Space Policy and Orbital Debris
• Orbital debris has been included in all national space policies since 1988.
• 1988 National Space Policy (signed 5 January 1988 by President Reagan) 
stated:
– “All space sectors will seek to minimize the creation of space debris.  Design and 
operations of space tests, experiments, and systems will strive to minimize or reduce 
the accumulation of space debris consistent with mission requirements and cost 
effectiveness.”
• Less than two years later on 16 November 1989 President G. H. W. Bush 
signed the 1989 National Space Policy, adding the following statement to 
the Reagan policy:
– “The United States Government will encourage other spacefaring nations to adopt 
policies and practices aimed at debris minimization.”
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1996 National Space Policy
• On 14 September 1996 President Clinton included a stronger statement on 
orbital debris in his National Space Policy:
– “The United States will seek to minimize the creation of space debris.  NASA, the 
Intelligence Community, and the DoD, in cooperation with the private sector, will 
develop design guidelines for future government procurements of spacecraft, launch 
vehicles, and services.  The design and operation of space tests, experiments and 
systems, will minimize or reduce accumulation of space debris consistent with mission 
requirements and cost effectiveness.
– “It is in the interest of the U.S. Government to ensure that space debris minimization 
practices are applied by other spacefaring nations and international organizations.  The 
U.S. Government will take a leadership role in international fora to adopt policies and 
practices aimed at debris minimization and will cooperate internationally in the 
exchange of information on debris research and the identification of debris mitigation 
options.”
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2006 National Space Policy
• The 2006 National Space Policy (signed 31 August 2006 by President G. W. 
Bush) states:
“Orbital debris poses a risk to continued reliable use of space-based services and 
operations and to the safety of persons and property in space and on Earth.  The 
United States shall seek to minimize the creation of orbital debris by government and 
non-government operations in space in order to preserve the space environment for 
future generations.  Toward that end:
• Departments and agencies shall continue to follow the United States Government 
Orbital Debris Mitigation Standard Practices, consistent with mission requirements and 
cost effectiveness, in the procurement and operation of spacecraft, launch services, 
and the operation of tests and experiments in space;
• The Secretaries of Commerce and Transportation, in coordination with the Chairman of 
the Federal Communications Commission, shall continue to address orbital debris 
issues through their respective licensing procedures; and 
• The United States shall take a leadership role in international fora to encourage foreign 
nations and international organizations to adopt policies and practices aimed at debris 
minimization and shall cooperate in the exchange of information on debris research 
and the identification of improved debris mitigation practices.”
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2010 National Space Policy
• The 2010 National Space Policy (released 28 June 2010 by President Barack 
Obama) states:
“Preserve the Space Environment.  For the purposes of minimizing debris and preserving the space 
environment for the responsible, peaceful, and safe use of all users, the United States shall:
• Lead the continued development and adoption of international and industry standards and policies to 
minimize debris, such as the United Nations Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines;
• Develop, maintain, and use space situational awareness (SSA) information from commercial, civil, and 
national security sources to detect, identify, and attribute actions in space that are contrary to responsible 
use and the long-term sustainability of the space environment:
• Continue to follow the United States Government Orbital Debris Mitigation Standard Practices, consistent 
with mission requirements and cost effectiveness, in the procurement and operation of spacecraft, launch 
services, and the conduct of tests and experiments in space;
• Pursue research and development of technologies and techniques, through the Administrator of the 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the Secretary of Defense, to mitigate and 
remove on-orbit debris, reduce hazards, and increase understanding of the current and future debris 
environment; and
• Require the head of the sponsoring department or agency to approve exceptions to the United States 
Government Orbital Debris Mitigation Standard Practices and notify the Secretary of State.”
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U.S. Government Orbital Debris 
Mitigation Standard Practices
• In response to the 1995 Interagency report on orbital debris, NASA and DoD 
developed draft orbital debris mitigation standard practices based upon 
NASA Safety Standard 1740.14.
• The Standard Practices cover four major areas:
– Control of debris released during normal operations
– Minimization of debris generated by accidental explosions
– Selection of safe flight profile and operational configuration
– Postmission disposal of space structure
• After coordination with the U.S. aerospace industry, the Standard Practices 
were approved Feb 2001 by all relevant U.S. Government agencies, 
departments, and organizations and have been used as a foundation for the 
development of international guidelines.
– Cited in 2006 and 2010 U.S. National Space Policy
– Each U.S. Government organization implements the Standard Practices according to 
established internal procedures
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USG OD Mitigation Standard Practices, Objective 1
OBJECTIVE 
1.  CONTROL OF DEBRIS RELEASED DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
Programs and projects will assess and limit the amount of debris released in a planned manner during normal operations. 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
MITIGATION STANDARD PRACTICES 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
1-1. In all operational orbit  regimes:  Spacecraft and upper stages should be designed to eliminate or minimize 
debris released during normal operations.  Each instance of planned release of debris larger than 5 mm in 
any dimension that remains on orbit for more than 25 years should be evaluated and justified on the basis 
of cost effectiveness and mission requirements.
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USG OD Mitigation Standard Practices, Objective 2
OBJECTIVE 
2.  MINIMIZING DEBRIS GENERATED BY ACCIDENTAL EXPLOSIONS 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
Programs and projects will assess and limit the probability of accidental explosion during and after completion of mission 
operations. 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
MITIGATION STANDARD PRACTICES 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
2-1.  Limiting the risk to other space systems from accidental explosions during mission operations: In 
developing the design of a spacecraft or upper stage, each program, via failure mode and effects analyses or 
equivalent analyses, should demonstrate either that there is no credible failure mode for accidental 
explosion, or, if such credible failure modes exist, design or operational procedures will limit the 
probability of the occurrence of such failure modes. 
 
2-2.  Limiting the risk to other space systems from accidental explosions after completion of mission operations: 
All on-board sources of stored energy of a spacecraft or upper stage should be depleted or safed when they 
are no longer required for mission operations or postmission disposal.  Depletion should occur as soon as 
such an operation does not pose an unacceptable risk to the payload.  Propellant depletion burns and 
compressed gas releases should be designed to minimize the probability of subsequent accidental collision 
and to minimize the impact of a subsequent accidental explosion. 
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USG OD Mitigation Standard Practices, Objective 3
OBJECTIVE 
3.  SELECTION OF SAFE FLIGHT PROFILE AND OPERATIONAL CONFIGURATION 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
Programs and projects will assess and limit the probability of operating space systems becoming a source of debris by 
collisions with man-made objects or meteoroids. 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
MITIGATION STANDARD PRACTICES 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
3-1.  Collision with large objects during orbital lifetime:  In developing the design and mission profile for a 
spacecraft or upper stage, a program will estimate and limit the probability of collision with known objects 
during orbital lifetime. 
 
3-2.  Collision with small debris during mission operations:  Spacecraft design will consider and, consistent with 
cost effectiveness, limit the probability that collisions with debris smaller than 1 cm diameter will cause 
loss of control to prevent post-mission disposal.  
 
3-3. Tether systems will be uniquely analyzed for both intact and severed conditions.
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
15 Orbital Debris Program Office
USG OD Mitigation Standard Practices, Objective 4
OBJECTIVE 
4.  POSTMISSION DISPOSAL OF SPACE STRUCTURES 
 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
Programs and projects will plan for, consistent with mission requirements, cost effective disposal procedures for launch 
vehicle components, upper stages, spacecraft, and other payloads at the end of mission life to minimize impact on future 
space operations. 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
MITIGATION STANDARD PRACTICES 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
4-1. Disposal for final mission orbits:  A spacecraft or upper stage may be disposed of by one of three methods: 
a. Atmospheric reentry option:  Leave the structure in an orbit in which, using conservative projections 
for solar activity, atmospheric drag will limit the lifetime to no longer than 25 years after completion of 
mission.  If drag enhancement devices are to be used to reduce the orbit lifetime, it should be 
demonstrated that such devices will significantly reduce the area-time product of the system or will not 
cause spacecraft or large debris to fragment if a collision occurs while the system is decaying from 
orbit.  If a space structure is to be disposed of by reentry into the Earth’s atmosphere, the risk of human 
casualty will be less than 1 in 10,000. 
b. Maneuvering to a storage orbit:  At end of life the structure may be relocated to one of the following 
storage regimes: 
I.  Between LEO and MEO:  Maneuver to an orbit with perigee altitude above 2000 km and 
apogee altitude below 19,700 km (500 km below semi-synchronous altitude 
II. Between MEO and GEO:  Maneuver to an orbit with perigee altitude above 20,700 km and 
apogee altitude below 35,300 km (approximately 500 km above semi-synchronous 
altitude and 500 km below synchronous altitude.) 
III.  Above GEO:  Maneuver to an orbit with perigee altitude above 36,100 km (approximately 
300 km above synchronous altitude) 
IV.  Heliocentric, Earth-escape:  Maneuver to remove the structure from Earth orbit, into a 
heliocentric orbit. 
 Because of fuel gauging uncertainties near the end of mission, a program should use a maneuver 
strategy that reduces the risk of leaving the structure near an operational orbit regime. 
c. Direct retrieval:  Retrieve the structure and remove it from orbit as soon as practical after completion of 
mission.  
4-2.  Tether systems will be uniquely analyzed for both intact and severed conditions when performing trade-offs 
between alternative disposal strategies.   
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USG Orbital Debris Mitigation 
Standard Practices Highlights
• Standard Practice 1: 
– Eliminate or minimize mission-related debris;
– Limit orbital lifetime of LEO debris to 25 years
• Standard Practice 2:
– Use design and procedures to avoid breakups during mission operations and after 
disposal
• Standard Practice 3:
– Protect against collisions with small debris and avoid collisions with large debris
• Standard Practice 4:
– LEO:  Limit post-mission orbital lifetime to 25 years limit human casualty reentry risk to 
1 in 10,000
– GEO:  Maneuver to a disposal orbit ~300 km above GEO
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Disposal of NASA and USG LEO Spacecraft
• Since 2001, several NASA and USG LEO spacecraft have maneuvered into 
lower disposal orbits at end of mission to accelerate natural orbital decay 
and atmospheric reentry.  Examples include
– 2001:  Landsat 4 2005:  ERBS and UARS
– 2008:  GFO 2010:  ICESat
UARS ICESat
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Challenge of High LEO Spacecraft
• For LEO spacecraft operating near or above 1400 km, it is normally more 
energy-efficient to maneuver into a storage orbit beyond 2000 km rather 
than to lower perigee sufficiently to reenter within 25 years.
– However, to date most spacecraft at these altitudes do not carry sufficient propellant to 
reach 2000 km (see next page for exception).
• The JASON 1 spacecraft, which operates near 1335 km, is a joint NASA-
CNES mission established in 1996, before international standards for LEO 
satellite disposal were adopted.  The vehicle has residual propellant to 
maneuver only a few hundred kilometers in semi-major axis.
• Since JASON 1 operates in a relative minimum of spatial density, 
passivating the spacecraft in place (e.g., using depletion burns to change 
plane and/or inclination) is preferable to maneuvering to a more congested 
lower or higher orbit.
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Disposal Activities of Globalstar Satellites in 2010
• Globalstar communications satellites operate near 1415 km.  At mission 
completion, the objective is to maneuver each satellite to a higher disposal 
orbit, preferably above LEO, i.e., above 2000 km. 
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LEO Deployment Options and 
Launch Vehicle Stage Disposal
• During the late 1990’s three major LEO communications networks were 
deployed:  Iridium, Orbcomm, and Globalstar.
• Iridium (780 km operational altitude)
– 88 spacecraft launched in 25 months (1997-1999) using three different launch vehicles 
from three countries
– Spacecraft released at altitudes near 500-650 km
• Proton orbital stages de-orbited; Delta and Long March orbital stages moved to lower orbits
– Only 1 of 26 stages still in orbit (remaining stage malfunctioned)
• Orbcomm (815 km operational altitude)
– 35 spacecraft launched as primary or secondary payloads
– 8 orbital stages used for dedicated missions (31 spacecraft); only one orbital stage will 
fail to meet 25-year guideline due to lower stage malfunction
• Globalstar (1415 km operational altitude)
– 52 spacecraft launched in 24 months (1998-2000)  using Delta and Soyuz launch 
vehicles
– Spacecraft released at altitudes near 900 km on 7 (6 Soyuz, 1 Delta) of 13 missions
– Only 2 of 19 stages still in orbit; Soyuz-IKAR stages were de-orbited into Pacific
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Disposal of TDRS 1 in 2010
• NASA’s first Tracking and Data Relay Satellite (TDRS) completed more than 
26 years of valuable service in October 2009.  
• During June 2010 the spacecraft conducted 12 separate maneuvers over an 
8-day period to reach a disposal orbit with a perigee more than 300 km 
above GEO, in accordance with U.S. and UN guidelines.
• After reaching the disposal orbit, TDRS 1 still possessed more than 120 kg 
of hydrazine.  This propellant was expended during 20 more hours of small 
thruster burns over a period of 10 days.
– To accomplish the depletion burns, the 
spacecraft was placed in a special
spin-stable attitude, which had never 
before been used by TDRS 1.
• TDRS 1 completed passivation actions 
on 27 June in an orbit 345 km by 525 km
above GEO. TDRS 1 spacecraft
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
22 Orbital Debris Program Office
DOD and other USG Agencies
• The Department of Defense has established an overall Directive on orbital 
debris mitigation (DoD Directive 3100.10, 1999).
– US Strategic Command, the former US Space Command, Air Force Space Command, 
and the National Reconnaissance Office have issued several policy directives and 
instructions to implement the DoD directive and National Space Policy.
• The Department of Transportation/FAA has issued regulations promoting 
orbital debris mitigation for commercial launch vehicles.
• The Federal Communications Commission has issued regulations 
promoting orbital debris mitigation for transmitting spacecraft.
• The Department of Commerce/NOAA has issued regulations promoting 
orbital debris mitigation for remote sensing spacecraft.
All of the above are consistent with and derived from 
the USG Orbital Debris Mitigation Standard Practices
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U.S. National Research Council
• Under the sponsorship of NASA, the U.S. National Research Council formed 
a committee of 11 technical experts from six spacefaring nations to perform 
an assessment of space debris and its consequences.
• The product of this committee, “Orbital Debris, A Technical Assessment”, 
was published in 1995.
– This volume remains an excellent primer on space debris.
• In addition to providing a summary of space debris research, the committee 
also offered “Techniques to Reduce the Future Debris Hazard”.
– These techniques are very similar to those found in the U.S. Government Orbital 
Debris Mitigation Standard Practices.
• The NRC also issued specific assessments for the Space Shuttle and Space 
Station programs in 1997.  
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Inter-Agency Space Debris 
Coordination Committee (IADC)
• Established in 1993:
– To exchange information on space debris research activities between member space 
agencies;
– To facilitate opportunities for cooperation in space debris research;
– To review progress of ongoing cooperative activities; and
– To identify debris mitigation options
• 12 members include all the leading space agencies in the world from 
Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Russia, Ukraine, 
United Kingdom, and the United States, as well as ESA.
– NASA delegation has included personnel from DoD, State, the FAA, and the FCC
• More than 100 orbital debris specialists meet annually to exchange 
information and to work on specified Action Items.
• IADC developed first consensus international orbital debris mitigation 
guidelines in October 2002; subsequently submitted to the United Nations.
Website:  www.iadc-online.org
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IADC Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines
• An Action Item (AI 17.2) to develop a consensus set of space debris 
mitigation guidelines was approved by the Steering Group of the IADC in 
October 1999.
• The “IADC Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines” (IADC-02-01) was adopted 
in October 2002 (slightly revised in 2007) and the complementary “Support 
to the IADC Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines” (IADC-04-06) was adopted 
in October 2004.
• The IADC Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines are quite similar to the U.S. 
Government Orbital Debris Mitigation Standard Practices with four major 
mitigation categories:
– Limiting debris released during normal operations
– Minimizing the potential for on-orbit breakups
– Postmission disposal
– Prevention of on-orbit collisions
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Orbital Debris at the United Nations
• Since 1994 the subject of orbital debris has been on the agenda of the 
Scientific and Technical Subcommittee (STSC) of the United Nations’ 
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS).
• A multi-year work plan culminated in the 1999 “Technical Report on Space 
Debris” (A/AC.105/720), summarizing the world state-of-knowledge 
concerning measurements and modeling of the environment as well as 
identified orbital debris mitigation measures.
• At the 2001 meeting of the STSC a new multi-year work plan was adopted 
which anticipated the presentation of the IADC Space Debris Mitigation 
Guidelines to the STSC in 2003.
• The IADC Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines were reviewed and discussed 
at STSC in both 2003 and 2004.
• STSC Member States adopted a similar set of space debris mitigation 
guidelines in Feb 2007, followed by adoption of the full COPUOS in June 
2007 and by the full General Assembly in late 2007.
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
27 Orbital Debris Program Office
UN COPUOS STSC Space Debris 
Mitigation Guidelines
• The 2007 UN COPUOS STSC Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines contains 
seven numbered guidelines:
– Guideline 1: Limit debris released during normal operations
– Guideline 2: Minimize the potential for break-ups during operational phases
– Guideline 3: Limit the probability of accidental collision in orbit
– Guideline 4: Avoid intentional destruction and other harmful activities
– Guideline 5: Minimize potential for post-mission break-ups resulting from stored energy
– Guideline 6: Limit the long-term presence of spacecraft and launch vehicle orbital 
stages in the low-Earth orbit (LEO) region after the end of their mission
– Guideline 7: Limit the long-term interference of spacecraft and launch vehicle orbital 
stages with geosynchronous Earth orbit (GEO) region after the end of their mission
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National Orbital Debris Mitigation Guidelines
• Since the establishment of the NASA policy and guidelines on orbital debris, 
an increasing number of countries have developed and adopted specific 
national guidelines promoting the mitigation of the growth of the orbital 
debris environment.
– Japan: Space Debris Mitigation Standard (NASDA-STD-18A), March 1996
– France: CNES Space Debris – Safety Requirements (MPM-50-00-12), April 1999; new 
national space law in December 2010.
– Russia: General Requirements for Mitigation of Space Debris Population (Branch 
Standard), July 2000
– China:  Requirements for Space Debris Mitigation (QJ 3221 – 2005), July 2005
• ESA issued a Space Debris Mitigation Handbook in February 1999, followed 
by a draft Space Debris Safety and Mitigation Standard in September 2000.
• These guidelines are very similar in most of their recommendations with the 
U.S. Government Orbital Debris Mitigation Standard Practices.
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European Code of Conduct for 
Space Debris Mitigation
• In June 2004 a draft European Code of Conduct for Space Debris Mitigation 
was completed by the five leading space agencies in Europe:  ESA, ASI 
(Italy), BNSC (UK), CNES (France), and DLR (Germany).
– In 2006 the final signature of the document was recorded.
• This new European document is divided into three main categories:
– Management Measures
– Design Measures
– Operational Measures
• Following the precedent set by IADC, a “Support to Implementation of the 
European Code of Conduct for Space Debris Mitigation” has also been 
produced.
• The European Code of Conduct for Space Debris Mitigation does add 
specificity, e.g., measures of effectiveness, similar to that of NASA’s NSS 
1740.14 and NS 8719.14.
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
30 Orbital Debris Program Office
International Academy of Astronautics
• The IAA, established in 1960, is a professional organization of 
approximately 1200 individuals with demonstrated expertise in one or more 
fields of astronautics.
• The IAA published its first position paper on space debris in 1993.  This was 
updated in 2000-2001.
– The position paper includes a section on “Implementation of Debris Control Methods”
• A new “Position Paper on Space Debris Mitigation” was released in 2005.
– This position paper addresses space debris issues and recommended mitigation 
measures separately for spacecraft and launch vehicles.
• An investigation of techniques to remediate the near-Earth space 
environment was conducted during 2007-2012.
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Orbital Debris and ISO
• The International Standards Organization (ISO) was founded under the 
auspices of the United Nations in 1946 to promote standardization 
development for the facilitation of international exchange of goods and 
services.
– Members of ISO include government and industry representatives.
– Compliance with ISO standards is voluntary.
• The Orbital Debris Coordination Working Group was established under ISO 
Technical Committee 20, Subcommittee 14, in May 2003.
– Using the IADC Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines as a foundation, the working group 
is developing a series of space debris mitigation standards.
– 24113, Space Debris Mitigation Requirements, is the overarching ISO space debris 
mitigation standard.
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Summary
• The current U.S. National Space Policy specifically calls on U.S. 
Government entities “to follow the United States Government Orbital Debris 
Mitigation Standard Practices, consistent with mission requirements and 
cost effectiveness, in the procurement and operation of spacecraft, launch 
services, and the operation of tests and experiments in space.”
• A large number of U.S., foreign, and international guidelines for mitigating 
the creation of new orbital debris now exist.
• Although they vary in their level of detail, all the guidelines have in common 
many fundamental elements, which are found in both the U.S. Government 
Orbital Debris Mitigation Standard Practices and NASA Standard 8719.14.
• All NASA space programs and projects are required to address orbital 
debris mitigation issues for both their spacecraft and launch vehicles in 
accordance with NPR 8715.6A and NS 8719.14A.
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NASA Orbital Debris Mitigation 
Procedural Requirements,  
Standards, and Handbook
Orbital Debris Program Office
NASA Johnson Space Center
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Outline
• NASA Procedural Requirements for Limiting Orbital Debris
• NASA Standard for Limiting Orbital Debris
• NASA Handbook for Limiting Orbital Debris
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NPR 8715.6A
• NASA Procedural Requirements for Limiting Orbital Debris, NPR 8715.6, 
was approved in August 2007 and replaced NASA Policy Directive 8710.3B.
– Highest level NASA document on orbital debris mitigation
– NPR 8715.6A was released in February 2008 as a minor revision to NPR 8715.6.
• The format of NPR 8715.6A is different than that of NPD 8710.3B and several 
new topics have been added.
– Chapter 1: Roles and Responsibilities of NASA personnel and offices
– Chapter 2: Program/Project Development and Prelaunch Preparations
– Chapter 3: Program/Project Operations (including disposal)
• Orbital Debris Assessment Reports are still required in conjunction with the 
Preliminary Design Review and Critical Design Review milestones.
– Format and content of the reports are set forth in NASA Standard 8719.14A.
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NPR 8715.6A Role and Responsibilities
• NPR 8715.6A sets forth explicit roles and responsibilities for a wide variety 
of NASA personnel and organizations:
– Chief, Safety and Mission Assurance
– Program’s Mission Directorate Associate Administrator
– Associate Administrator, Space Operations Mission Directorate
– Associate Administrator, Exploration Systems Mission Directorate
– Assistant Administrator, Office of External Affairs
– Assistant Administrator, Office of Public Affairs
– NASA Office of the General Counsel
– NASA HQ Environmental Management Division
– KSC Launch Services Program Manager
– NASA Center Safety and Mission Assurance Directors
– NASA Orbital Debris Program Office
– SMA Technical Authority
– NASA Program/Project Manager
– NASA Planetary Protection Officer
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Program’s Mission Directorate 
Associate Administrator
• Responsibilities of the Program’s Mission Directorate Associate 
Administrator are as follows:
– 1.3.2.1 The MDAA shall be the NASA official accepting the orbital debris risk as determined by the 
SMA Technical Authority due to noncompliances to this NPR and NSS 1740.14 or NASA-STD 
8719.14 as documented in the ODAR and EOMP (Requirement 56741).
– 1.3.2.2 The MDAA shall ensure that a mission orbital debris assessment has been conducted in 
accordance with NSS 1740.14 or NASA-STD 8719.14, as applicable per paragraph P.2.4, to 
determine the potential for orbital debris generation from the launch vehicle and the payload 
(Requirement 57296).
– 1.3.2.3 The MDAA shall ensure that orbital debris mitigation measures identified in the ODAR are 
implemented and included in the EOMP (Requirement 56743).
– 1.3.2.4 The MDAA shall ensure that a formal review of the potential to generate orbital debris is 
conducted before implementing the EOMP (Requirement 56744).
– 1.3.2.5 The program's MDAA shall provide to the Chief/OSMA, for Chief/OSMA concurrence, a 
phase-in plan and schedule for either development of new EOMPs, modification of existing EOMPs, 
or grandfathering of existing EOMPs within four months of the approval of this NPR (Requirement 
56745).
– 1.3.2.6 The MDAA shall ensure that the orbital debris requirements of this NPR are included as an 
integral part of their program/project, to include proposals and Announcements of Opportunity for 
future missions (Requirement 56746).
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Orbital Debris Program Office
• Responsibilities of the NASA Orbital Debris Program Office are as follows:
– 1.3.11.1 The NASA ODPO shall maintain a list of predicted reentry dates for NASA spacecraft and 
their associated orbital stages and notify the OSMA at least 60 days prior to their reentry 
(Requirement 56773).
– 1.3.11.2 The NASA ODPO shall develop, maintain, and update the orbital debris environment 
models to support this NPR (Requirement 56774).
– 1.3.11.3 The NASA ODPO shall assist NASA mission program/project managers in technical 
orbital debris assessments by providing information and/or directing queries to the knowledgeable 
technical staff (Requirement 56775).
– 1.3.11.4 The NASA ODPO shall provide assistance to the Department of Defense and other U.S. 
Government departments and organizations on matters related to the characterization of the 
orbital debris environment and the application of orbital debris mitigation measures and policies for 
NASA space missions (Requirement 56776).
– 1.3.11.5 The NASA ODPO shall participate in the determination, adoption, and use of international 
orbital debris mitigation guidelines through international forums such as the United Nations 
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, the IADC, and the ISO (Requirement 56777).
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
7 Orbital Debris Program Office
Orbital Debris Mitigation Program 
Setup and Control
• Chapter 2.1 sets forth the responsibilities of the program/project manager 
in establishing an orbital debris mitigation process.
• PM shall
– implement OD requirements for those portions of a spaceflight program/project over 
which NASA has control;
– include applicable OD design requirements in program/project requirements;
– include NPR requirements in agreements and contracts necessary to ensure 
compliance with the NPR;
– deliver an abbreviated ODAR to program/project integrator for missions jointly 
developed/built/managed by multiple NASA Centers/facilities;
– deliver an abbreviated ODAR to non-NASA launching or lead Agency;
– include a review of the orbital debris requirements as part of the program/project 
System Requirements Review.
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Orbital Debris Assessment Reports  (ODARs)
• Requirement for preparation of ODARs is set forth in NPR 8715.6A, Chapter 
2.2.1.
– Content and format for ODARs are set forth in NS 8719.14
• ODARs are submitted by the Program/Project Manager to Mission 
Directorate Associate Administrator, who in turn forwards the ODARs to 
Chief/OSMA and AA/SOMD.
• Schedule:  Initial ODAR submitted prior to PDR; 
Updated ODAR submitted NLT 45 days prior to CDR;
Final ODAR submitted 30 days prior to safety and mission 
assurance (SMA) launch readiness review
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End-of-Mission Plans  (EOMPs)
• Requirement for preparation of EOMPs is set forth in NPR 8715.6A, Chapter 
2.2.2.
– Content and format for EMOPs are set forth in NS 8719.14A
• ODARs are submitted by the Program/Project Manager to Mission 
Directorate Associate Administrator, Chief/OSMA and AA/SOMD.
• Schedule: Initial EOMP submitted NLT 45 days prior to CDR;
Prelaunch EOMP submitted 30 days prior to SMA launch 
readiness review
Annual review of EOMP during mission operations
Final EOMP prior to 30 days before EOMP notification
• Additional requirements for vehicles which will impact the Earth or travel 
beyond GEO.
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ODAR and EOMP Review and Risk Acceptance
• All ODARs and EOMPs are reviewed by the Mission Directorate Associate 
Administrator, Chief OSMA, and AA/SOMD, as well as the NASA Orbital 
Debris Program Office (Chapters 2.2.1-2.2.3)
• OD Program Office reviews are submitted to OSMA utilizing formats 
specified in NS 8719.14A.
• MDAA will accept any risks associated with noncompliances, after 
coordination with Chief/OSMA, Chief Engineer, and AA/SOMD, indicating 
reasons and justification.
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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Mission Operations
• Chapter 3 of NPR 8715.6A sets additional requirements during mission 
operations, including
– monitoring of spacecraft and launch vehicle stages to detect intended or unintended 
operations that could generate debris around Earth, the Moon, and Mars or at an 
Earth-Sun Lagrange point;
• special attention paid to critical items for vehicles in orbit about Earth or the Moon
– notifications and assessment of debris generation events;
– notifications when vehicle no longer serves any useful function or purpose;
– notifications when redundancy or other key functionality is lost in the end-of-life 
disposal or deorbit system;  and
– notifications when propellant level required for controlled deorbit or disposal maneuvers 
is projected to occur within six months or propellant level falls to less than 115% for 
end-of-mission maneuvers.
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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End-of-Mission Actions
• Chapter 3.3 of NPR 8715.6A sets additional requirements for end-of-mission 
planning and execution, including
– passivation of spacecraft designed for reentry into Earth’s atmosphere or for disposal 
about the Earth or the Moon;
– avoidance of lunar disposal orbits;  and
– examination of potential lunar landing or crash sites.
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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Conjunction Assessments
• Chapter 3.4 of NPR 8715.6A sets requirements for avoiding accidental 
collisions of Earth-orbiting objects.
– 3.4.1 The NASA Program/Project Manager shall have conjunction assessment 
analyses performed routinely for all maneuverable Earth-orbiting spacecraft with a 
perigee height of less than 2000 km in altitude or within 200 km of GEO (Requirement 
56891).
– 3.4.2 Conjunction assessment analyses shall be performed using the USSTRATCOM 
high-accuracy catalog as a minimum (Requirement 56892).
– 3.4.3 The NASA Program/Project Manager shall have a collision risk assessment and 
risk mitigation process in place for all maneuverable Earth-orbiting spacecraft that are 
performing routine conjunction assessment analyses (Requirement 56893).
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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NASA Standard 8719.14A
• NASA Standard 8719.14 replaced NASA Safety Standard 1740.14 in August 
2007.  Revised as NS 8719.14A in December 2011.
– Specifies orbital debris mitigation requirements and performance standards
– First change in 12 years.
• For procedural reasons, the guidelines of NSS 1740.14 have become 
requirements in NASA Standard 8719.14A.
– Instances of non-compliance must now be handled via formal waiver process.
• NASA Standard 8719.14A contains detailed directions on how each Orbital 
Debris Assessment Report (ODAR) and each End-of-Mission Plan (EOMP) 
shall be prepared.
– Spacecraft and launch vehicle topics are separated for ease of preparation.
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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Categories of Assessments
• Assessment of debris released during normal operations
• Assessment of debris generated by explosions and intentional breakups
• Assessment of debris generated by on-orbit collisions
• Postmission disposal of space structures
• Survival of debris from postmission disposal Earth atmospheric reentry 
option, including human casualty risk
• Assessment requirements for tether missions
Specific orbital debris mitigation requirements are provided at 
the end of your class notebook.
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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Handbook for Limiting Orbital Debris
• The Handbook for Limiting Orbital Debris is a new type of NASA document 
for orbital debris mitigation.
• The handbook, NASA Handbook 8719.14, provides additional technical 
background information on a wide variety of orbital debris environment and 
mitigation topics.
• The handbook is divided into seven major sections:
– Current Orbital Debris Environment
– Future Environment
– Measurements of the Orbital Debris Environment
– Modeling the Orbital Debris Environment
– Micro-Meteoroid and Orbital Debris Shielding
– Mitigation
– Reentry
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
17 Orbital Debris Program Office
Summary
• NASA’s new procedural and technical requirements for limiting the 
generation of orbital debris are based upon 15 years of experience in 
establishing and enforcing orbital debris mitigation measures.
• The procedures and requirements are consistent with the orbital debris 
mitigation guidelines of the IADC and the United Nations.
• The procedures and requirements, like the near-Earth space environment 
itself, are evolutionary in nature and incorporate to the greatest extent 
possible lessons learned.
• NASA NPR 8715.6A, NASA Standard 8719.14A, and NASA Handbook 
8719.14 can also be accessed via the website of the NASA Orbital Debris 
Program Office:   www.orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov/library/references.html
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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Why Reentry Risk Management?
• Limiting satellite orbital lifetimes can transfer an on-orbit risk for satellites 
to a terrestrial risk for people and property.
• President’s National Space Policy directs agencies and departments to 
implement U.S. Government Orbital Debris Mitigation Standard Practices.
– The Standard Practices set a threshold of human casualty risk from reentering debris 
to 1 in 10,000 per reentry event.
• This risk threshold has been adopted by a growing number of foreign space 
agencies.
To limit human casualties from surviving satellite debris
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NASA, USG, and Foreign Human 
Casualty Reentry Risk Criteria
Orbital Debris Program Office
NASA Johnson Space Center
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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Rate of Space Object Reentries
• On average, one uncontrolled man-made object has fallen back to Earth each 
day for the past 50 years.
– Majority are small and burn up
– Components which survive typically fall in bodies of water or sparsely populated regions
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Examples of Recovered Satellite Components
Texas, 1997 South Africa, 2000 Saudi Arabia, 2001
Guatemala, 2003
Argentina, 2004
Bangkok, 2005Australia, 2007
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
5 Orbital Debris Program Office
MSX Rocket Body Reentry 
• Following the reentry of a Delta 2 second stage over Oklahoma and Texas 
in 1997, fragments were found in four separate locations.
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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Space Stations and Related Vehicles
• Space Stations and their large modules are designed for controlled 
reentries over the Pacific Ocean due to their large numbers of survivable 
components.  On four occasions malfunctions led to uncontrolled reentries.
• More than 130 logistical vehicles (i.e., Progress, ATV, HTV) have also been 
de-orbited in a controlled manner.
• A controlled reentry is also planned for the International Space Station.
Salyut 1 1971 20 metric tons Controlled
Salyut 2 1973 20 metric tons Uncontrolled
Cosmos 557 1973 20 metric tons Uncontrolled
Salyut 3 1975 20 metric tons Controlled
Salyut 4 1977 20 metric tons Controlled
Salyut 5 1977 20 metric tons Controlled
Cosmos 929 1978 20 metric tons Controlled
Skylab 1979 75 metric tons Uncontrolled
Salyut 6‐Comos 1267 1982 40 metric tons Controlled
Cosmos 1443 1983 20 metric tons Controlled
Salyut 7‐Cosmos 1686 1991 40 metric tons Uncontrolled
Mir 2001 140 metric tons Controlled
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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The Reentry of Skylab
• Plans to dispose of the Skylab space station safely went awry when (1) the 
maiden flight of the Space Shuttle slipped from the late 1970’s to the early 
1980’s and (2) solar activity during Cycle 21 (peak in Dec 1979) was higher 
than anticipated.
• At the time, Skylab was the most massive satellite to approach reentry and 
was essentially uncontrollable.
• The imminent reentry cause concern in many parts
of the world:
“Capital Jittery as Skylab Fall Nears”  LA Times, 1 Jul 79
“Panic Hits India as Skylab’s Death Nears; Marcos
Urges Calm; Swiss to Ring Bells”  LA Times, 4 Jul 79
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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Preparing for Skylab Reentry
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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Skylab Down Under
• Skylab fell to Earth uncontrolled on 11 July 1979 spreading debris over the 
southern Indian Ocean and western Australia.
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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Reentry of the Mir Space Station
• The Mir space station was de-orbited in a controlled manner over the 
Pacific Ocean on 23 March 2001.
– The U.S. Space Surveillance Network and NASA JSC provided support for the reentry 
operations.
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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Reentry of ATV-1
• ATV-1, the first European logistics vehicle 
to ISS, was de-orbited over the Pacific 
Ocean on 29 September 2008.
• Two highly-instrumented aircraft were in position to record the vehicle’s 
breakup.
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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ATV-1 Debris Spectral Analysis
Different fragments have different emission signatures: a) Main cargo cabin: Mg, Al (not shown) 
and Ba emissions, but no Ti nor Cr;    b) Ring with lithium batteries: strong Li (and Al) (not 
shown), Cu, and Ti, but no Cr;    c) bottom propulsion bay: strong Ti and Cr (and Al) emissions;    
d) Minor fragment during a brief flare-up: strong Ti emission (one of the initial fragments 
generated during the main explosion). 
Data measured from GV aircraft with NIRSPEC instrument. 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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Reentry of Radioactive Materials
• Due in large measure to public concern, the reentry of radioactive materials 
has been addressed thoroughly since the early 1960’s.
• Two principal options for unanticipated reentries:
– Design for unit demise and dispersion of radioactive materials
– Design for unit survivability and potential recovery
• The April 1964 launch failure of Transit 5BN3  
with the SNAP-9A radioisotope thermoelectric 
generator (RTG) led to a redesign of future RTGs 
to ensure intact reentry survivability. 
• The subsequent launch failure in 1968 of Nimbus B with the SNAP-19B2 
RTG proved the survivability of the unit, which was later recovered.
SNAP-9A
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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Soviet Nuclear Reactors in Low Earth Orbit
• After component testing in the late 1960’s, the former Soviet Union 
launched its first nuclear reactor in low Earth orbit in 1970 as part of a naval 
reconnaissance system.  The spacecraft were known as RORSATs.
• The spacecraft was designed to operate at an altitude of about 260 km for 
several months after which the section housing the reactor would be 
boosted to a storage orbit between 900 and 1000 km.
– Accidental reentries due to launch or spacecraft malfunctions were not adequately 
addressed.
• Use of higher altitude disposal orbits permitted
radioactive decay of the most hazardous 
materials prior to atmospheric reentry hundreds
of years hence.
– However, the disposal orbits were in the most highly
congested region of LEO.
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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Reentry of Cosmos 954
• Cosmos 954, a nuclear-powered Soviet RORSAT, malfunctioned in late 1977 
and reentered in an uncontrolled manner over Canada in January 1978.
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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Redesign of RORSAT and Cosmos 1402
• The survivability of radioactive components from Cosmos 954 was 
enhanced by the protection of the fuel core by the heavy reactor housing.
• Soviet engineers reasoned that another failure to boost the reactor to a 
higher altitude storage orbit could not be completely prevented.  Therefore, 
they chose a solution which would mitigate the consequences of such a 
failure.
• Future RORSAT vehicles employed an ability to eject the fuel core from the 
reactor.  Reentering by itself, the fuel core would more completely be 
consumed.
• RORSAT flights resumed in 1980.  In 1982 Cosmos 1402 also experienced a 
failure to boost to a storage orbit.  The fuel core and the reactor reentered 
separately two weeks apart in early 1983 over broad ocean areas.
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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Uncontrolled Chinese FSW 1-5 Capsule Reentry
• A Chinese microgravity mission was launched on 8 October 1993 for a 
planned 8-day mission after which a reentry capsule was to be recovered.
• A misalignment of the vehicle at the time of the de-orbit burn, pushed the 
capsule into a higher, elliptical orbit.
• The capsule eventually reentered, amid great public interest, in an 
uncontrolled fashion in March 1996.
Typical successful FSW recoveryNominal de-orbit sequence
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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Controlled Reentry of Delta IV Second Stage
• To prevent potential human casualties and ground damage, in 2006 the 
DMSP 5D-3 F17 Delta IV second stage demonstrated the ability for a 
controlled reentry from a circular orbit of 850 km.
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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Origin of NASA Reentry Risk Metrics
• NASA Safety Standard 1740.14 (August 1995) first established the guideline 
for all LEO spacecraft and launch vehicle orbital stages to remain in orbit 
for no more than 25 years after end of mission for the purpose of protecting 
the space environment for future operations.
– This guideline is now accepted by the U.S. Government and many foreign space 
agencies and international bodies.
• The most practical and cost-effective strategy for compliance is disposal of 
the vehicle in a low altitude orbit from which a natural, uncontrolled reentry 
will occur within the allotted time.
• However, such uncontrolled reentries shift on-orbit satellite collision risks 
to human casualty risks on Earth.  To limit human casualty risks from 
surviving satellite debris, NASA developed a specific risk criterion and risk 
assessment process.
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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Reentry Risk Criterion
• In NASA Safety Standard 1740.14 (1995), a total debris casualty area metric 
was established:
where N is the number of objects that survive reentry and Ai is the area of the surviving piece in m2.  The 
term 0.6 represents the square root of the average cross-sectional area of a standing person, as viewed 
from above.  Debris with impacting kinetic energies less than 15 Joules are no longer considered.
• Total human casualty expectation, E, can then be defined as
E = DA x  PD
where PD is equal to the average population density for the particular orbital inclination and year of 
reentry.
• A fundamental human casualty risk threshold of 1 in 10,000 per reentry 
event was adopted by NASA in 1995, which was equivalent to a debris 
casualty area of no more than 8 m2 averaged over all inclinations for that 
year.
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World Population Evolution
• Using internationally recognized sources for the 2000 world population and 
its expected evolution through 2050, average population densities weighted 
by the fraction of time a satellite spends at different latitudes as a function 
of orbital inclination have been developed.
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Probability of Impact versus Population Density
Probability that reentering object will fall in a region with a population 
density greater than or equal to the given value
0.000001
0.00001
0.0001
0.001
0.01
0.1
1
0.01 0.1 1 10 100 1000 10000 100000
Population Density [per square mile]
P
r
o
b
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
1:1
1:10
1:100
1:1000
1:10,000
1:100,000
1:1,000,000
Manhatten
Washington, DC
Oklahoma City
Nevada
58 deg inclination
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
24 Orbital Debris Program Office
Background for ISS Jettison Policy
• Informal discussions on jettison policy 
begun by 2002, in part, due to 
accumulation of debris on ISS.
• Non-functional items inside and outside 
ISS can pose hazard to crew and/or 
impede productivity.
• Loss of Space Shuttle Columbia in 
February 2003 resulted in immediate 
cessation of shuttle flights, worsening the 
debris situation on ISS.
• Jettison policy must address safety of 
crew, ISS, visiting vehicles, other space 
objects, and people on Earth, as well as 
orbital debris mitigation guidelines.
Inside ISS, March 2002
Inside ISS, May 2005
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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Kick-off of ISS Jettison Policy
• 6 tracked (shown) and 7 untracked debris released intentionally in 2004 led 
to task for the development of formal ISS jettison policy.
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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ISS Debris Mitigation
• All approved ISS jettison activities should be compliant with NASA, U.S., 
and international orbital debris mitigation guidelines.
– Object should not pose a fragmentation risk prior to reentry in excess of 1 in 10,000
– No object should remain in Earth orbit for more than 25 years
– Cumulative object-time product for ISS jettisoned debris should be less than 100 
object-years
– Risk of human casualty from the reentry of a jettisoned object should not exceed 1 in 
10,000
• The above goals are normally easily met.
– Reentry risk assessments are conducted by the NASA Orbital Debris Program Office.
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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ISS Jettison of EAS in 2007
• The Early Ammonia Servicer (EAS) was attached to the P6 truss of ISS in 
2001.  Removal of EAS was required before relocation of P6.
• EAS was too large or hazardous to return to Earth in the Space Shuttle or a 
logistics vehicle or to relocate on ISS.
• Although a survivability assessment for EAS yielded a reentry human 
casualty risk of about 1 in 5,000, no safer option was available.
EAS JettisonTesting EAS for Jettison
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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The Iridium Constellation Quandary
• The Iridium constellation of communications satellites in low Earth orbit 
(altitude of 780 km) was initially deployed during 1997-1999.
• With 74 operational spacecraft (560 kg dry mass each), Iridium filed for 
bankruptcy in August 1999.  The proposed disposal of Iridium assets called 
for initiating uncontrolled reentries of all working spacecraft.
– Controlled reentries were not possible due to small spacecraft thrusters.
• Although each spacecraft was designed to satisfy the 1 in 10,000 
recommended reentry risk threshold (assessed 1 in 18,400), the aggregate 
risk of human casualty from all 74 spacecraft was ~ 1 in 250.
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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The Iridium Constellation Quandary (2)
• NASA component reentry survivability assessment (47 different component 
types) found only six surviving debris: 
Total Debris Original Impact
Item No.   Component Casualty Area (m2) Total Mass (kg) Velocity (mph)
11 Sep Foot 1.4 6.3 130
Bracket (3)
27 Propellant Tank 1.3 9.8 50
39 Battery 1.0 30.5 125
42 Electronic COM Panel 2.3 115.9 45
6.1 m2 162.5 kg*
* surviving mass will normally be less
• A new owner took control of the Iridium network and disposal of the 
spacecraft was postponed.
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
The Other Option
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NASA Reentry Risk Evaluation Process
• Reentry risk assessments are required for all NASA programs and projects 
in conjunction with the Preliminary Design Review (PDR) and Critical 
Design Review (CDR) milestones.
• NASA maintains two levels of reentry risk assessment software:
DAS (Debris Assessment Software)  
and
ORSAT (Object Reentry Survival Analysis Tool)
• DAS is publicly available and can be used by program/project personnel.
• ORSAT is a higher fidelity, more capable model run by trained specialists at 
the NASA Johnson Space Center.
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
32 Orbital Debris Program Office
NASA Standard 8719.14A
• NSS 1740.14 was replaced in 2007 with NASA Standard 8719.14.
• Section 4.7 of NASA STD 8719.14A is entitled “Survival of Debris from the 
Postmission Disposal Earth Atmospheric Reentry Option”:
“Requirement 4.7-1. Limit the risk of human casualty:  The potential for human 
casualty is assumed for any object with an impacting energy in excess of 15 joules:
“a) For uncontrolled reentry, the risk of human casualty from surviving debris shall 
not exceed 0.0001 (1:10,000)  (Requirement 56626).
“b) For controlled reentry, the selected trajectory shall ensure that no surviving 
debris impact with a kinetic energy greater than 15 joules is closer than 370 km from 
foreign landmasses, or within 50 km from the continental U.S., territories of the U.S., 
and the permanent ice pack of Antarctica  (Requirement 56627).
“c) For controlled reentries, the product of the probability of failure of the reentry 
burn (from Requirement 4.6-4.b.) and the risk of human casualty assuming 
uncontrolled reentry shall not exceed 0.0001 (1:10,000)  (Requirement 56628).”
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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Kinetic Energy versus Probability of Fatality
• The 15 J limit for human casualty was derived from various positions and 
medical considerations.  Fatality is a subset of Casualty.
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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USG Orbital Debris Mitigation Standard Practices
• The US Government Orbital Debris Mitigation Standard Practices were first 
developed in 1997, in response to direction from the White House Office of 
Science and Technology Policy.
• The draft Standard Practices were presented to industry in January 1998 
and adopted via a USG Interagency process in early 2001.
• Standard Practice 4-1 addresses spacecraft and launch vehicle stage 
disposal options.
– For vehicles in low Earth orbit, the vehicle should be left in an orbit which will result in 
reentry within 25 years, taking into account potential human casualty risks on Earth.
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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US Government Orbital Debris Mitigation 
Standard Practice 4-1
“4-1. Disposal for final mission orbits: A spacecraft or upper stage may be disposed of by one of three methods:
a.  Atmospheric reentry option:  Leave the structure in an orbit in which, using conservative projections for 
solar activity, atmospheric drag will limit the lifetime to no longer than 25 years after completion of mission.  If 
drag enhancement devices are to be used to reduce the orbit lifetime, it should be demonstrated that such 
devices will significantly reduce the area-time product of the system or will not cause spacecraft or large 
debris to fragment if a collision occurs while the system is decaying from orbit.  If a space structure is to be 
disposed of by reentry into the Earth’s atmosphere, the risk of human casualty will be less than 1 in 10,000.
b.  Maneuvering to a storage orbit:  At end of life the structure may be relocated to one of the following 
storage regimes:
I.   Between LEO and MEO:  Maneuver to an orbit with perigee altitude above 2000 km and apogee  altitude 
below 19,700 km (500 km below semi-synchronous altitude
II.   Between MEO and GEO:  Maneuver to an orbit with perigee altitude above 20,700 km and apogee   
altitude below 35,300 km (approximately 500 km above semi-synchronous altitude and 500 km below 
synchronous altitude.)
III.  Above GEO:  Maneuver to an orbit with perigee altitude above 36,100 km (approximately 300 km above 
synchronous altitude)
IV.  Heliocentric, Earth-escape:  Maneuver to remove the structure from Earth orbit, into a heliocentric orbit.
Because of fuel gauging uncertainties near the end of mission, a program should use a maneuver 
strategy that reduces the risk of leaving the structure near an operational orbit regime.
c.  Direct retrieval:  Retrieve the structure and remove it from orbit as soon as practical after completion of 
mission.”
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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Japanese Space Debris Standard
• Japan quickly followed NASA’s 1995 lead in issuing orbital debris 
mitigation guidelines with the NASDA Space Debris Mitigation Standard 
(NASDA-STD-18) in 1996.  This was followed by NASDA-STD-18A in 2003 
and JMR-003A in 2004.
• NASDA-STD-18A Section 5.4 is Requirements for Re-entry or Natural Decay 
Disposal Options:
“5.4.1 Lifetime reduction and natural decay
“If space systems are maneuvered to reduce the orbital lifetime or left as they are with 
expectation of natural decay, the following requirements should be complied.
(1) Hazard caused by ground impact of objects surviving atmospheric re-entry (estimated by 
“Number of Casualty”, “Probability of injury for Individual” and “Impact”) should be estimated 
prior to the launch event, and reconfirmed when the event time would be cleared.  In case that the 
value of “Number of Casualty” would exceed 1 x 10-4 [human / event], the best effort to conduct 
controlled reentry into safe impact zone should be made with consideration of state-of-the-art and 
attitude of foreign space organizations.
(2) In both case of natural decay and controlled re-entry, the best effort to realize lower 
survivability should be paid with considering state-of-art and attitude of foreign space 
organizations.”
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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IADC Space Debris Mitigation Guideline
• The Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines of the Inter-Agency Space Debris 
Coordination Committee (IADC) are essentially derived from the U.S. 
Government Orbital Debris Mitigation Standard Practices and were adopted 
in 2002 by the 11 IADC member agencies.
• Guideline 5.3.2 addresses reentry disposals for space vehicles.
“Whenever possible spacecraft or orbital stages that are terminating their operational 
phases in orbits that pass through the LEO region, or have the potential to interfere 
with the LEO region, should be de-orbited (direct re-entry is preferred) or where 
appropriate manoeuvred into an orbit with a reduced lifetime. Retrieval is also a 
disposal option. 
“A spacecraft or orbital stage should be left in an orbit in which, using an accepted 
nominal projection for solar activity, atmospheric drag will limit the orbital lifetime after 
completion of operations. A study on the effect of post-mission orbital lifetime limitation 
on collision rate and debris population growth has been performed by the IADC.  This 
IADC and some other studies and a number of existing national guidelines have found 
25 years to be a reasonable and appropriate lifetime limit.  If a spacecraft or orbital 
stage is to be disposed of by re-entry into the atmosphere, debris that survives to reach 
the surface of the Earth should not pose an undue risk to people or property.”
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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Support to the IADC Space Debris 
Mitigation Guidelines
• In 2004, the IADC adopted and released a companion document to the 
“IADC Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines”, entitled “Support to the IADC 
Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines”.  Excerpt pertaining to reentry risks:
“One effective space debris mitigation measure is the removal of mission-terminated 
space objects from useful orbit regions and the disposal of them by aerodynamic 
heating during re-entry, if possible.  However, the ground casualties that might be 
caused by fragments surviving atmospheric re-entry should be carefully considered 
in planning uncontrolled re-entry, particularly for large spacecraft.
“To assess the human casualty risk of impact by objects that survive re-entry, 
assessment parameters and their allowable levels, reliable analysis tools for 
survivability, and acceptable analysis conditions should be developed…
“Typical parameters to assess re-entry safety are casualty area and the casualty 
expectation (Ec).  An allowable Ec is not currently recommended in the IADC 
Guidelines, while NASA Safety Standard 1740.14, the U.S. Government Orbital Debris 
Mitigation Standard Practices, and NASDA Space Debris Mitigation Standard 
(NASDA-STD18A) limit the value of Ec to less than 10-4 [persons per event].”
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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United Nations Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines
• The United Nations Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines were developed 
within the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space and adopted in 
2007, followed by endorsement of the General Assembly the same year.
• Guideline 6 addresses space vehicle disposal in LEO:
– “Spacecraft and launch vehicle orbital stages that have terminated their operational 
phases in orbits that pass through the LEO region, should be removed from orbit in a 
controlled fashion. If this is not possible, they should be disposed of in orbits which 
avoid their long-term presence in the LEO region.
“When making determinations regarding potential solutions for removing objects from 
LEO, due consideration should be given to ensure that debris which survives to reach 
the surface of the Earth does not pose an undue risk to people or property, including 
through environmental pollution caused by hazardous substances.”
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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European Code of Conduct for 
Space Debris Mitigation
• The European Code of Conduct for Space Debris Mitigation entered into 
force in 2006.  This document was signed by the heads of the Italian, 
French, German, and UK space agencies, as well as the Director General of 
ESA.
• Design Measures, Paragraph 4.4.2, addresses re-entry issues.
• SD-DE-12
“a)  A space project should limit the risk from re-entering space debris to a safe level
“b)  The end of life operations should take into account the applicable on ground safety  
rules, which depend on the launching state.
“c)  The casualty risk on ground should not exceed 10-4 per re-entry.
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ESA Instruction for Reentry Risks
• In 2008 the Director General of the ESA issued an instruction to implement 
the European Code of Conduct for Space Debris Mitigation.  Two 
operational requirements address reentry risks:
OR-06:  “For space systems that are disposed of by re-entry, the prime contractor 
shall perform an analysis to determine the characteristics of fragments surviving to 
ground impact, and assess the total casualty risk to the population on the ground 
assuming an uncontrolled re-entry.”
OR-07:  “In case the total casualty risk is larger than 10-4, uncontrolled re-entry is not 
allowed. Instead, a controlled re-entry must be performed such that the impact foot-
print can be ensured over an ocean area, with sufficient clearance of landmasses and 
traffic routes.”
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U.S. Reentry Prediction Process
• The U.S. Space Surveillance Network (SSN) conducts Reentry Assessments 
(RAs) [aka TIPs, Tracking and Impact Prediction] for spacecraft, rocket 
bodies, and selected other space objects.
• Official RAs are published at specified intervals prior to anticipated reentry:
– T – 4 days, T – 3 days, T – 2 days, T – 24 hours, T – 12 hours, T – 6 hours, T – 2 hours
• However, the uncertainties of these projections for reentry time and location 
are subject to substantial errors and cannot be used for warning purposes
– Even the final T – 2 hour prediction for an object in a circular orbit has an error on the 
order of +/- 25 minutes, which is equivalent to +/- ~12,000 km (next chart).
• The Orbital Debris Program Office informs NASA HQ and other 
organizations concerning the reentries of NASA spacecraft and rocket 
bodies.
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Reentry Prediction Uncertainty
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IADC and Reentries
• In 1996 the IADC began discussions aimed at implementing a Risk Object 
Reentry Communications Network.  The concept was adopted in 1998 and 
added to the IADC Terms of Reference in 1999 (Annex VI).
– Interest pre-dated Mars 1996 accident (Nov 96)
– Preliminary exercise involved reentry of FSW 1-5 in Mar 1996
– NASA-DoD agreement to support IADC concept in Aug 1996
– Final IADC process received USG Interagency approval
• The objective of the internet-based communications network is to relay 
tracking and reentry prediction information in real-time in the event of the 
uncontrolled reentry of a risk object.
– A Risk Object is normally defined as a satellite (1) with a mass of more than 5 metric 
tons, (2) containing hazardous (e.g., radioactive) materials, or (3) of a special nature
– Data and information is hosted on a server at ESA ESOC (Darmstadt, Germany)
• IADC Risk Object Reentry Exercises are conducted annually to test 
communications links and processes.
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Sample IADC Final Reentry Prediction Summary
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Special Case of USA-193
• A US government spacecraft (USA-193) was launched in December 2006 
and failed immediately after entering a low altitude orbit.
• The spacecraft propulsion tank contained ~450 kg of hydrazine, which soon 
froze.
• An uncontrolled reentry of USA-193 was predicted for March 2008.
• NASA was tasked to evaluate the survivability of the propellant tank and its 
contents and to estimate the reentry human casualty risk.
– The NASA Orbital Debris Program Office conducted these assessments.
• A Presidential decision was made to engage USA-193 with a sea-launched 
missile to eliminate the threat to people from surviving hydrazine.
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USA-193 Propellant Tank
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USA-193 Reentry Preparations
• The intention to engage USA-193 was announced to the public on 14 
February.
• IADC member countries were notified that the IADC Risk Object Reentry 
Communications Network would be activated in the event that the 
engagement of USA-193 was unsuccessful.
• A presentation was made by the US to the Scientific and Technical 
Subcommittee of the United Nation’s Committee on the Peaceful Uses of 
Outer Space (COPUOS) on 19 February to summarize the anticipated effects 
of a successful engagement on the near-Earth space environment.
– The planned engagement was completely compliant with all US, IADC, and UN space 
debris mitigation recommendations.
• The engagement was successful:  USA-193 was destroyed at an altitude of 
~ 250 km on 21 February 2008 (20 February in US).
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Maximum Longevity of Debris
• Assuming a worst case scenario of fragmentation at 250 km, 99% of the 
debris placed in orbit will reenter within one week.
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Engagement of USA-193
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Failure of EUTELSAT W3B Satellite
• Shortly after its launch and injection into a highly elliptical geosynchronous 
transfer orbit on 28 October 2010, the EUTELSAT W3B spacecraft suffered a 
major leak in the oxidizer section of its main propulsion system.
• After an assessment determined that the spacecraft could not be 
maneuvered into a useful geosynchronous orbit, a preliminary decision was 
made to conduct a controlled reentry to remove the vehicle as a hazard to 
other resident space objects or people and property on Earth.
– A controlled reentry of the Astra 1K spacecraft was executed after it was stranded in a 
GTO in 2002.
• However, before deorbit plans could be prepared the EUTLESAT W3B fuel 
began to freeze, preventing any further maneuvers.
– The 3-metric-ton dry mass spacecraft might remain in Earth for another two decades or 
more before reentering in an uncontrolled manner.
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Recent High Profile Reentries
• During September 2011 – January 2012, three spacecraft uncontrolled 
reentries received significant international attention.
– NASA’s UARS reentered on 24 September 2011
– Germany’s ROSAT reentered on 23 October 2011
– Russia’s Phobos-Grunt reentered on 15 January 2012
• UARS was the most massive (5.7 metric tons) NASA uncontrolled reentry in 
over 30 years.
• Phobos-Grunt had a total mass of 13.5 metric tons of which ~11 metric tons 
were propellants.
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
55 Orbital Debris Program Office
NASA Provision for Intentional Breakups
• NASA Standard 8719.14A permits the intentional breakup of a space vehicle 
under special conditions, if necessary.
4.4.2.2.1 Requirement 4.4-3.  Limiting the long-term risk to other space systems from 
planned breakups: Planned explosions or intentional collisions shall:
a) Be conducted at an altitude such that for orbital debris fragments larger than 10 cm the 
object-time product does not exceed 100 object-years (Requirement 56453).  For example, 
if the debris fragments greater than 10cm decay in the maximum allowed 1 year, a 
maximum of 100 such fragments can be generated by the breakup.
b) Not generate debris larger than 1 mm that shall remain in Earth orbit longer than one 
year (Requirement 56454).
4.4.2.2.2 Requirement 4.4-4:  Limiting the short-term risk to other space systems from 
planned breakups: Immediately before a planned explosion or intentional collision, the 
probability of debris, orbital or ballistic, larger than 1 mm colliding with any operating 
spacecraft within 24 hours of the breakup shall be verified to not exceed 10-6 (Requirement 
56455).
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Summary of Deliberate Satellite Breakups
Russian Federation
United States
China
Number of Events
Total Number of 
Cataloged Debris
Number of Cataloged 
Debris in orbit on 
1 March 2012
  ‐ Malfunction of Recoverable Vehicle 15 1045 0
  ‐ Fractional Orbit Bombardment System 2 93 0
  ‐ Co‐Orbital Antisatellite Tests 9 743 296
  ‐ Early Warning 17 167 144
  ‐ Designed End‐of‐Mission 8 81 0
  ‐ Engineering Test 1 35 0
  ‐ Air‐launched Antisatellite Test 1 285 0
  ‐ Technology Test 1 18 0
  ‐ Reentry Risk Mitigation 1 175 0
  ‐ Ground‐launched Antisatellite Test 1 3218 2989
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Summary
• NASA, the U.S. Government, the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination 
Committee (IADC), the United Nations, ESA, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, 
and the UK all recognize that the reentry of spacecraft and launch vehicle 
stages pose potential risks to people on Earth from surviving debris.
• All established quantitative human casualty risk criteria are consistent with 
limiting human casualties to less than 1 in 10,000 per reentry event.
• When initial risk estimates exceed 1 in 10,000, risk reduction via vehicle 
redesign or via controlled reentry are the principal options.
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DAS and ORSAT
• The Debris Assessment Software (DAS) is a multi-functional set of software 
tools used to evaluate program/project compliance with NASA orbital 
debris mitigation requirements.
– It contains a moderate fidelity reentry risk assessment module.
• The Object Reentry Survival Analysis Tool (ORSAT) is a specialized code 
designed to provide a high fidelity assessment of space vehicle and 
component reentry survivability.
• Excerpt from NASA Standard 8719.14A (paragraph 4.7.4.d):
– “Due to the complexity of satellite reentry physics and material responses, NASA 
programs and projects are required in paragraph 1.1.3 of this NASA-STD to employ 
either DAS or a higher fidelity model called ORSAT (Object Reentry Survival Analysis 
Tool) to determine compliance with Requirement 4.7-1.” 
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DAS and ORSAT  (continued)
• Both software tools require a detailed description of each component 
comprising the space vehicle in question.
– Material properties, shape, dimensions, aero and thermal masses, and, if applicable, 
internal construction, e.g., electronics box.
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Debris Assessment Software (DAS)
• DAS was developed in 1995 explicitly to support NASA programs and 
projects in their evaluation of orbital debris mitigation guidelines and the 
preparation of orbital debris assessment reports required by then NASA 
Safety Standard 1740.14.
• DAS X.9 was released in 1996, followed by DAS 1.0 in 1998.  
• DAS 2.0 (2007) represents a significant improvement over DAS 1.0 (and its 
subsequent minor revisions) and is specifically designed to accompany 
NASA Standard 8719.14A.
• The DAS 2.0 software and its documentation are available for download at 
www.orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov/mitigate/das.html.
• All versions of DAS contain routines to perform a first-order assessment of 
human casualty risks associated with uncontrolled space vehicle reentries.
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DAS Reentry Assessment Philosophy
• DAS is designed for use by individuals who are not familiar with reentry 
physics.
• DAS simplifies some of the phenomenologies involved in the reentry and by 
design yields a slightly conservative result.
– If a program/project is found to be compliant for reentry risk using DAS, then further 
assessments are normally not required.
– If a program/project is found to be not compliant for reentry risk using DAS, then an 
evaluation using ORSAT is normally required.
• DAS only applies to natural reentries from nearly circular orbits.
– More complex orbits or controlled reentries must be evaluated by ORSAT
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DAS GUI for Reentry Assessment
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Object Reentry Survival Analysis Tool (ORSAT)
• In 1992 GSFC contacted JSC for assistance in assessing the reentry 
survivability of the EOS-AM (now called Terra) spacecraft.
– This was the start of the development of ORSAT at JSC
• Major versions of ORSAT were released in 1993, 1999, 2001, 2002, and 2006.
– Version 6.0 (January 2006) documented in JSC-62861.
• Current version is ORSAT 6.1 (November 2006).
• NASA-wide ORSAT Tutorial held at JSC in 2001.
• ORSAT requires specialized technical knowledge in reentry physics and 
training with the operation of ORSAT.
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ORSAT Applications
• NASA has conducted a large number of reentry survivability assessments 
for a wide variety of spacecraft, rocket bodies, and special objects in 
support of NASA, DoD, FAA, NOAA, DOJ, and foreign entities.
– Sample assessments for NASA: HST, TRMM, CGRO, GLAST, UARS, EUVE, Aura, 
Aqua, Terra, GPM, Genesis, ODERACS, Space Shuttle, ISS jettisons, Atlas V, Delta 
IV, Pegasus, JPL tank designs
– U.S. Government Interagency:  Iridium, USA-193
– Sample assessments for others: TACSAT, Taurus, NPP, Delta IV (sub-orbital), ROSAT 
(Germany), ADEOS (Japan)
• Validation with actual reentries is undertaken to the greatest extent 
possible, e.g., Delta 2 second and third stages and Sandia fuel rod.
• Few reentry survivability models are comparable to ORSAT.
– German/ESA SCARAB model is independent; results are similar.
– Explicit comparisons conducted since 1999, bilaterally and under auspices of the 
IADC
– Japanese model is derived from older version of ORSAT.
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ORSAT-SCARAB Generic Satellite Comparison
• Joint effort between ORSAT team at JSC and the 
SCARAB team in Germany during 2007-2008
– 35 unique objects representing simplified models of 
typical satellite components
– Approximately 400 kg mass
– Initial trajectory conditions
• Altitude – 122 km •  Velocity – 7.41 km/s
• Inclination – 52° •  Flight Path Angle  – -0.1°
– Environmental Conditions
• Zonal Harmonics up to J4
• Earth Flattening 
 Eccentricity of Earth = 0.08182
• U.S. Standard 1976 Atmosphere
Early generic satellite concept sketch by ORSAT Team 
SCARAB model for generic satellite
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Study Conclusions
• Careful examination revealed that ORSAT and SCARAB arrived at very 
similar results
– Of 33 unique objects modeled both codes strongly agree on the fates of 31 of those
• Predicted 29 to demise in a similar fashion
• Predicted 2 (LH2 tank, RWA flywheels) to demise in much the same way
– Only 2 objects showed notable variance
• The result for one object was very close (near the demise/survive threshold)
• The difference in the debris casualty area which resulted form the contents 
of a battery box  (1 item in SCARAB, 3 unique items in ORSAT) was not an 
effect of the differing methods employed to model the reentry physics, but 
instead reflected a difference in safety philosophy associated with 
geometric description of components.
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ORSAT Sample Summary Table:
Surviving Components
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Summary
• Initial reentry risk assessments should be performed with DAS for 
anticipated uncontrolled reentries from low eccentricity orbits.
– provides moderate fidelity solution
– parametric assessments of individual components possible
– software available on NASA orbital debris website
• ORSAT analysis should be requested if
– controlled reentry is planned
– reentry orbit will be highly elliptical
– DAS results indicate that human casualty risks exceed 1 in 10,000
– special component design analyses are desired, i.e., design for demise
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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ORSAT Principal Applications
• Assessments of spacecraft, launch vehicle stage, and other man-made 
space object component survivability during atmospheric entry from sub-
orbital, orbital, and deep space trajectories.
• Assessments of human casualty risk associated with uncontrolled 
reentries.
• Characterization of surviving debris footprints associated with controlled 
reentries for the purpose of avoiding inhabited regions and the Antarctic 
permanent ice pack.
• Investigation of reentry effects on individual components to aid in “design 
for demise” activities.
The principal outputs of ORSAT are component demise altitude or 
location, surviving mass, and kinetic energy of impact.
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Basic Elements of ORSAT
• ORSAT is divided into six major portions:
1. Trajectory
2. Atmosphere
3. Aerodynamics
4. Aerothermodynamics
5. Thermal / ablation
6. Debris casualty area
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Partial ORSAT Input Satellite Data:  
WISE Spacecraft
Object 
Number Object Description Qty Material Density
Body 
Type
Object 
Width/Diam
eter
Object 
Length Object Height
Object 
(Thermal) 
Mass
Aero 
mass
(m) (m) (m) (kg)
Bus Al 5052 2684.6 Cylinder 1.27 0.838 39.099 123.233
1.1 Bus Structure Flat Panel 1 1 Al 5052 2684.6 Flat Plate 0.504 0.610 0.0050300 4.330
1.2 Bus Structure Flat Panel 2 1 Al 5052 2684.6 Flat Plate 0.504 0.610 0.0025440 2.190
1.3 Bus Structure Flat Panel 3 1 Al 5052 2684.6 Flat Plate 0.504 0.610 0.0024050 2.070
1.4 Bus Structure Flat Panel 4 1 Al 5052 2684.6 Flat Plate 0.504 0.610 0.0024050 2.070
1.5 Bus Structure Flat Panel 5 1 Al 5052 2684.6 Flat Plate 0.504 0.610 0.0024050 2.070
1.6 Bus Structure Flat Panel 6 1 Al 5052 2684.6 Flat Plate 0.504 0.610 0.0024050 2.070
1.7 Bus Structure Flat Panel 7 1 Al 5052 2684.6 Flat Plate 0.504 0.610 0.0024050 2.070
1.8 Bus Structure Flat Panel 8 1 Al 5052 2684.6 Flat Plate 0.504 0.610 0.0024050 2.070
1.9 Top Deck 1 Al 5052 2684.6 Box 1.27 1.27 0.0270000 14.910
1.10 Aft Ring Frame 1 Al 6061-T6 2707 Cylinder 0.024 3.990 -- 5.249
1.11 Corner Posts 8 Al 6061-T6 2707 Cylinder 0.017 0.610 -- 0.391
1.12 Star Tracker  Bracket 1 Al 6061-T6 2707 Box 0.0415 0.0415 0.0414913 0.200
1.13 Reaction Wheel Bracket 1 Al 6061-T6 2707 Box 0.0608 0.0608 0.0607898 0.629
1.14 +Y LGA Bracket 1 Al 6061-T6 2707 Box 0.0464 0.0464 0.0464159 0.280
1.15 -Y LGA AFT Ring Bracket 1 Al 6061-T6 2707 Box 0.0497 0.0497 0.0497126 0.344
1.16 -Y LGA Mast 1 Al 6061-T6 2707 Box 0.0416 0.0416 0.0415604 0.201
1.17
IMU Mounting Plate Slotted Array Ku-Band 
Standoff 4 Al 6061-T6 2707 Box 0.0304 0.0304 0.0304432 0.079
1.18 Balance Mass A 1 Tungsten 16995.1 Box 0.102326 0.102326 0.1023264 3.000
1.19 Balance Mass B 1 Tungsten 16995.1 Box 0.10232641 0.10232641 0.1023264 3.000
1.20 Balance Mass C 1 Tungsten 16995.1 Box 0.10232641 0.10232641 0.1023264 3.000
1.21 Balance Mass D 1 Tungsten 16995.1 Box 0.07094917 0.07094917 0.0709492 1.000
1.22
Reaction Wheel Assembly, minus the steel 
bearings; Ithaco TW-4A12 3 Al 5052 2684.6 Box 0.205 0.205 0.0640000 1.550 4.550
1.22.1 Reaction Wheel bearings 3 SS 304L 8000 Box 0.071 0.071 0.0709492 1
1.23 Reaction Wheel Electronics 1 Al 6061-T6 2707 Box 0.190 0.320 0.1500000 0.910
1.24 Torque Rod Ithaco TR60CFR Qty.3 3 Iron 7860 Cylinder 0.023 0.493 1.7
1.25 Magnetometer 1 Al 6061-T6 2707 Box 0.043 0.155 0.0360000 0.231
1.26 Star Tracker  2 Al 6061-T6 2707 Box 0.135 0.142 0.0290000 0.348
1.27 Coarse Sun Sensor 14 Al 6061-T6 2707 Box 0.017 0.017 0.0169235 0.014
1.28 LN-200S Rate Sensor 1 Al 6061-T6 2707 Box 0.086 0.089 0.0349024 0.748
1.29 Battery box 1 Al 6061-T6 2707 Box 0.2159 0.3175 0.1651000 2.76 5.400
1.29.1 Battery cell case;  8-30Ahr cells (NCP25-1) 8 SS 304L 8000 Box 0.0947928 0.1397 0.0274320 0.149 0.330
1.29.1.1 Battery electrode, graphite 8 graphite 2250 Box 0.0947928 0.1397 0.0137160 0.181
1.30 Spacecraft Control Avionics 1 Al 6061-T6 2707 Box 0.22 0.28 0.2200000 16.46
1.31 TDRSS Transponder S-Band 1 Al 6061-T6 2707 Box 0.16 0.2 0.1400000 3.2
1.32 Hybrid Coupler 2 Al 6061-T6 2707 Box 0.05 0.06 0.0200000 0.05
1.33 Antenna Assy S-Band 2 Al 5052 2684.6 Box 0.114 0.254 0.0060000 0.73
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
5 Orbital Debris Program Office
Effects of Materials and Mass: Spheres
• The trajectories and survivability of simple spheres are greatly influenced 
by their materials and mass (size).
– Cases 1-3:  Spheres with 0.25 m diameters (10-30 kg)
– Cases 4-6:  Spheres with 0.50 m diameters  (40-115 kg)
– Cases 7-9:  Spheres with 1.00 m diameters  (160-450 kg)
• Different shapes will also lead to varying reentry results
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Evaluation of a Complex Component:  Nested
TRMM Precipitation Radar
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Evaluation of a Complex Component:  Composite
No surviving elements
UARS Magnetic Torquer Rod Assembly
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Parametric ORSAT Analysis of Different Initial 
Temperatures and Oxidation Heating Efficiencies
Survivability Factor vs. Initial Temperature for 
UARS Forward Bulkhead Fitting
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Sample Debris Footprint Assessment
EOS - Aqua: Surviving Debris Foot Print (Targeted Entry)
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Example ORSAT Case:  WISE
• The Wide-field Infrared Survey Explorer (WISE) was launched on 14 
December 2009 into a low Earth orbit (~525 km, 97.5 deg inclination).
• The 645 kg (dry mass) spacecraft is now expected to reenter about 2021, 
depending on solar activity.
• An aperture cover was ejected on 30 December
and is predicted to reentry about 2013.
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
11 Orbital Debris Program Office
WISE Surviving Component Assessment
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Object 
Number Object Name Qty Material
Body 
Type
Demise 
Factor 
(%)
Debris 
Casualty 
Area 
(m 2^)
Total 
DCA 
(m 2^)
Downrange 
(km)
Impact 
Mass 
(kg)
Total 
Impact 
Mass 
(kg)
Kinetic 
Energy 
(J)
Ballistic 
Coefficient
1.18 Balance Mass A 1 Tungsten Box 39.63 0.49 0.49 9509.37 3.00 3.00 6583.40 267.95
1.19 Balance Mass B 1 Tungsten Box 39.63 0.49 0.49 9509.37 3.00 3.00 6583.40 267.95
1.20 Balance Mass C 1 Tungsten Box 39.63 0.49 0.49 9509.37 3.00 3.00 6583.40 267.95
1.21 Balance Mass D 1 Tungsten Box 39.75 0.45 0.45 9423.27 1.00 1.00 1516.80 186.42
1.42.1.1 Primary Tank and foam 1 Al 6061-T6 Flat Plate 72.78 1.498 1.50 9061.97 7.2 7.20 2190.5 37.83
1.42.1.2 Secondary Tank and foam 1 Al 6061-T6 Flat Plate 41.88 3.979 3.98 9049.87 32.1 32.10 8706.5 33.74
1.42.1.4 Thermal Link End Fitting (Ring) 1 Beryllium Flat Plate 31.9 0.492 0.49 8995.07 0.1 0.10 15.9 19.81
1.42.1.5 Thermal Link End Fitting (Plug) * 2 Beryllium Box 57.14 0.395 0.79 9046.07 0.03 0.06 7.5 37.15
Totals 7.90 49.46
RISK
(Assumes 2013 Reentry)
* Not Included in DCA total due to low Kinetic Energy (<15J)
1: 12158
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Sample Assessment:  
Compton Gamma Ray Observatory
• CGRO was deployed by the Space 
Shuttle in April 1991.
• Failure of a gyro on CGRO in December 
1999 left the spacecraft zero-fault 
tolerant for a planned controlled 
reentry.
• A re-evaluation of the human casualty 
risk for CGRO using ORSAT yielded a 
total debris casualty area of 52.5 m2, 
i.e., a human casualty risk of 1 in 1200.
• Consequently, CGRO was commanded 
to a controlled reentry over the Pacific 
Ocean on 4 June 2000.
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CGRO Reentry
4 June 2000
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TRMM Reentry Case
• The Tropical Rainfall Measuring Mission (TRMM) is a joint US-Japan Earth 
science spacecraft launched in 1997 on a 3-year mission.
– Dry mass of TRMM is 2620 kg
– Designed for controlled reentry
• ORSAT assessment in 2002 found the human casualty risk from an 
uncontrolled reentry to be ~ 1 in 4600, i.e., non-compliant with NASA safety 
standards.
• Mission given extensions until 2005 when residual propellant would reach 
minimum required for controlled reentry from 400 km altitude.
• After considerable debate, TRMM was relieved of controlled reentry 
requirement to prolong mission until Global Precipitation Measurement 
(GPM) spacecraft could be launched (then predicted to be 2010).
– Rationale was that TRMM, through its hurricane tracking and other capabilities, had the 
potential to save lives, out-weighing the risk of human casualty from uncontrolled 
reentry
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TRMM Reentry Case (2)
• A total of 12 objects with an aggregate mass of 112 kg are expected to 
survive reentry and impact along a 475 km footprint.
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Sample Assessment:  Hubble Space Telescope
• HST has a mass of ~11 metric tons and no
maneuver capability.
• An ORSAT assessment of the human 
casualty risk arising from an uncontrolled
reentry of HST found a casualty area of
more than 150 m2 and a risk on the order 
of 1 in 250 for a reentry in 2020.
• 627 different components analyzed
• Consequently, NASA has reiterated its intention of conducting a controlled 
reentry with the future attachment of a specialized propulsion unit.
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Predicted Demise Altitudes and Impact Locations
for HST Components: Uncontrolled Reentry
Component demise altitudes
Surviving component locations
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
18 Orbital Debris Program Office
Sample Assessment:  Delta 2 Second Stage
• Delta 2 launch vehicles have been used frequently by NASA to launch 
Earth-orbiting and deep space payloads.
• Delta 2 second stage is known to have at least six surviving components.
– ORSAT analyses confirm survivability of these six components
Stainless Steel Propellant Tank (270 kg)
Titanium Spheres
- 2 small (10 kg)
- 2 large  (30 kg)
Engine Nozzle  (30 kg)
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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Delta IV and Atlas V Orbital Stages
• The Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) program was undertaken 
by DoD in the 1990’s and led to the development of the Delta IV and the 
Atlas V, which both had maiden launches in 2002.
• Both ELVs have large second stages which reach Earth orbit.
• ORSAT reentry survivability assessments of both stages revealed severe 
non-compliance for human casualty risk.
– Risks on the order of 1 in 1,000 for both stages
• Delta IV missions:  second stages left in a storage orbit between LEO and 
GEO (GOES 13-15).  DoD has demonstrated controlled reentry on multiple 
missions.
• Atlas V missions:  second stages placed in a storage orbits between LEO 
and GEO (SDO and TDRS-11), on interplanetary trajectory (MRO, New 
Horizons, and Juno), or lunar impact trajectory (LRO/LCROSS).  Controlled 
deorbit has been demonstrated by NASA for RBSP mission and by DoD).
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Sample Assessment:  Spacecraft Propellant Tanks
• Spacecraft and launch vehicle stage propellant tanks are routinely evaluated 
by ORSAT.  
– These tanks are often made of titanium or stainless steel and survive reentry.
– These tanks are either evacuated prior to reentry or are emptied very early in the reentry 
scenario.
• In 2007 ORSAT was used to determine the survivability of a tank with a large 
amount of frozen hydrazine.
– A majority of the hydrazine was projected to survive reentry in a slush state, posing a 
special hazard of human casualty after impact.
– Consequently, a decision was made to destroy prior to reentry the vehicle containing the 
tank (USA-193).
• Due to the lessons of USA-193, since 2008 the survivability of several tank 
designs from JPL and GSFC have been evaluated for a variety of scenarios, 
including both orbital and ballistic reentry.
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
21 Orbital Debris Program Office
Sample Assessment:  Spacecraft Propellant Tanks
(continued)
• Assessments were made for numerous initial conditions
Vehicle Initial Fuel 
Mass (kg)
Mass Liquid 
Fuel (kg)
% Fuel 
Melted
Tank Demise 
Altitude (km)
Bursts w/ 
Pressurant 
(Y/N)
Burst 
Altitude w/ 
Pressurant
Bursts w/o 
Pressurant(Y/N)
Burst Altitude 
w/ Pressurant
Cassini 135 133.0 98.55% 0.0
CGRO 470 313.1 66.61% 0.0
Juno 358 207.6 58.00% 51.7
MRO 1149 596.2 51.89% 0.0
MSL Cruise Stage 36 36.0 100.00% 75.4 Y 71.5 Y 63.4
MSL Descent Stage 129 97.4 75.54% 49.7
Vehicle Initial Fuel 
Mass (kg)
Mass Liquid 
Fuel (kg)
% Fuel 
Melted
Tank Demise 
Altitude (km)
Bursts w/ 
Pressurant 
(Y/N)
Burst 
Altitude w/ 
Pressurant
Bursts w/o 
Pressurant(Y/N)
Burst Altitude 
w/ Pressurant
Cassini 135 126.2 93.51% 0.0
CGRO 470 286.9 61.04% 0.0
Juno 358 186.2 52.01% 47.3
MRO 1149 530.2 46.14% 0.0
MSL Cruise Stage 36 36.0 100.00% 66.5 Y 62.9 Y 51.2
MSL Descent Stage 129 97.9 75.91% 0.0
122 km Initial Altitude
78 km Initial Altitude
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
22 Orbital Debris Program Office
Reentries from Deep Space
• ORSAT can also assess reentries from extremely elliptical Earth orbits or 
reentries from deep space, e.g., Genesis and Stardust.
• ORSAT was employed to evaluate potential off-nominal trajectories of the 
Genesis spacecraft bus.
– Scenarios:  Initial flight path angles of -5 and -8 degrees
With and without Genesis capsule attached
– Results:  All bus components demised in all four scenarios
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General Reentry Survivability Observations
• First Law of Reentry Survivability Assessments:
The vast majority of components will always survive or demise over a range 
of realistic initial conditions.
• Second Law of Reentry Survivability Assessments:
A reentry risk assessment is only as good as the vehicle technical 
definition.
• Surviving objects tend to fall into one or more of the following categories:
– High melting-point materials, e.g.,  titanium, beryllium
– Low ballistic coefficients, i.e., large area-to-mass ratio
– Internal (buried) components
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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Comparative Satellite  Survival Assessments
Spacecraft Total Mass, kg Est. Surviving Mass, kg  (%)
Mir/Progress M 140,000 30,000  (20%) *
Skylab 74,800 18,200-22,700  (24-30%) *
Gamma Ray Obs.                   13,700 5,800  (42%)
Delta 4 second stage 4,000 1,895  (47%) +
Delta 2 second stage 920 340  (37%) +
Iridium 560 163  (29%)
* Not evaluated by ORSAT       + Inclination dependent
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Sample Comparisons of S/C Mass and DCA
• No simple relationship exists between reentering satellite mass and 
surviving component hazard.
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Debris Casualty Area  (m2)
NPP  (188 components analyzed)
GPM, Ti PMD  (255 
components analyzed)
Aqua  (123 components analyzed)
GLAST  (110 components analyzed)
TRMM  (207 components analyzed)
Aura  (132 components 
analyzed)
UARS  (138 components analyzed)
WISE (82 components analyzed)
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Summary
• ORSAT is NASA’s highest fidelity model for evaluating the survivability of 
space vehicle components following controlled or uncontrolled reentries.
• ORSAT assessments require detailed reentry orbit characteristics and 
descriptions of all vehicle components:
– material type, size, shape, mass, number, placement
• The survivability of most components is easily determined and is 
insensitive to initial conditions.
• Special evaluations can be required for some components.
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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Design for Demise
• Most space vehicles with a mass exceeding 500 kg are likely to pose a 
reentry risk of human casualty greater than 1 in 10,000.
• To avoid such risks, three basic options are available to a space system 
operator:
– execute a controlled reentry over a broad ocean area;
– maneuver the space system to a long-lived storage orbit above 2000 km; or
– redesign the space system to reduce the reentry risk of human casualty.
• The first two options are often not viable due to inherent limitations of the 
space system, e.g., due to no propulsion system or one which is inadequate 
for a controlled reentry (insufficient propellants or thrust).
• In such cases, redesigning the space system to promote more complete 
component demise, i.e., design for demise (D4D), might be the most cost-
effective means of compliance with NASA Standard 8719.14A.
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Application of Design for Demise
• The output of ORSAT will identify which components of a space vehicle are 
expected to survive reentry.  Those components with the greatest 
aggregate debris casualty area (an individually large DCA or numerous 
copies of a lesser DCA) can then be examined for potential redesign.
– Items which are commonly found to survive reentry in whole or in part are propellant 
and pressurant tanks, reaction wheel assemblies, valves, hinges, and solar array drive 
mechanisms.
• Space systems with a mass of 1000 kg or more typically cannot be made 
reentry risk compliant by design for demise alone.
– However, a reduction in debris casualty area can relax reliability requirements on 
subsystems needed for controlled reentries (NASA Standard 8719.14, Requirement 
4.7-1.c.)
• Components redesigned for demise can potentially be employed by other 
spacecraft, off-setting or reducing future costs.
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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Potential Solutions
• Whenever feasible, low-melting temperature materials can be substituted 
for high-melting temperature materials.
– Other material property requirements (e.g., coefficient of thermal expansion) might limit 
such substitutions.
• Large structural elements can sometimes be machined to reduce mass and 
decrease the likelihood of survival, while still meeting structural 
requirements.
• Single simple components (e.g., a plate) can sometimes be redesigned in 
layers which would individually demise or impact the Earth with a kinetic 
energy of less than 15 joules.
• A container which hosts multiple surviving components can be redesigned 
to survive, thereby preventing the release of the internal components.
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5 Orbital Debris Program Office
Global Precipitation Measurement (GPM) Spacecraft
• GPM was the first major spacecraft which adopted a comprehensive 
design-for-demise philosophy at the start of the project.
– Started approximately eight 
years before planned launch.
• One of the objectives was to avoid having to size the propulsion system for 
a controlled reentry, since GPM was to be a multi-ton spacecraft.
• Two major design efforts were undertaken (the propellant tank and the 
reaction wheel assemblies), although other elements were also identified 
early in the project as having potential reentry survivability.
GPM Core Observatory
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Global Precipitation Measurement (GPM) 
Spacecraft  (continued)
• Due to the large size of GPM (3000 kg class), compliance with the human 
casualty risk requirement for reentry could not be achieved by vehicle 
design.
– The project elected to baseline a controlled reentry, which had been held in reserve as 
an option.
• The D4D effort for GPM did yield valuable results:
– A demisable aluminum tank for hydrazine was developed.
– A demisable aluminum propellant management device 
(PMD) for the propellant tank was developed.
– Demisable reaction wheel assemblies were developed.
• These successes will be available for use on future 
NASA spacecraft.
Upper
Collector
Vanes (4)
Standpipe
with Fins
Upper
Reservoir
Vanes
Pressurization Tube
Upper Window
into Standpipe
Lower
Collector
Vanes (4)
Outlet Tube
Sump
Lower
Reservoir
Vanes
Lower Window
into Standpipe
Demisable Hydrazine Tank
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Highlights of Survivability Assessments for GPM
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Tank Studies
Discuss S/C Demisability
H2-A stage Demisability
Instrument 
Mount 
Analyses
Interface Plate 
Analyses
(S/C 1612 kg)
GSFC RWA 
Analyses
Commercial 
RWA Analyses
Antenna Plate 
Analyses
1st S/C ORSAT 
Assmt,
130 obj, DCA=13 m2 
(2494 kg)
2nd S/C ORSAT 
Assmt,
240  obj, DCA=95 m2  
(2676 kg)
3rd S/C ORSAT Assmt,
240  obj, DCA=40 m2  
(2676 kg)
4th S/C ORSAT Assmt,
255  obj, DCA=27 m2  
(2676 kg)
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GPM Results  (March 2009)
• 15 out of 255 components were assessed to survive reentry 
with impacting energies greater than 15 joules
(vehicle variant with aluminum propellant management device)
Total DCA 
(15 J 
Limit)
Total 
DCA (20 J 
Limit)
23.4 15.6
1.7 0.0
1.7 0.0
2.2 2.2
2.2 2.2
1.6 1.6
1.1 1.1
1.2 1.2
0.5 0.5
0.9 0.0
1.3 1.3
2.8 2.8
3.6 0.0
1.1 1.1
0.5 0.5
1.0 1.0
ID No. Name Qty Material
Body 
Type
Thermal 
Mass
Aero 
Mass
Diameter/
Width Length Height Radius
Demise 
Factor (%)
Debris 
Casualty 
Area 
(m^2)
Impact 
Mass (kg)
Kinetic 
Energy (J)
0 Spacecraft 1 Aluminum 6061-T6 Box 1334.0 2676.0 2.54 4.28 2.39 2.39
3 X Stiff +Y 1 Gr\Ep Honeycomb Box 5.2 5.2 0.42 2.33 0.02 0.02 94 1.658 0.82 16.0
4 X Stiff -Y 1 Gr\Ep Honeycomb Box 5.2 5.2 0.42 2.33 0.02 0.02 94 1.658 0.83 16.3
83 LB Structure + Y 1 Aluminum 6061-T6 Box 26.2 26.2 1.24 1.26 0.05 0.03 93 2.199 6.5 612.0
84 LB Structure -Y 1 Aluminum 6061-T6 Box 26.2 26.2 1.24 1.26 0.05 0.03 93 2.199 6.5 612.0
86 LB Structure +X (Bottom Deck) 1 Aluminum 6061-T6 Box 59.5 59.5 1.46 1.97 0.06 0.03 94 1.606 8.64 1894.8
132 GMI MR Interface Bracket 2 Titanium (6 Al-4 V) Box 0.5 0.5 0.13 0.15 0.11 0.11 73 0.536 0.5 115.3
136 GMI Calibration Structure 1 Albemet Box 1.5 1.5 0.42 0.67 0.36 0.36 63 1.228 1.5 76.4
140 GMI Fitting Calibration 1 Titanium (6 Al-4 V) Box 0.5 0.5 0.09 0.11 0.04 0.04 89 0.469 0.35 153.3
145 GMI RDA F. A. - Larger 2 Titanium (6 Al-4 V) Box 0.1 0.1 0.09 0.10 0.01 80 0.452 0.1 19.2
166 GMI Spin Mechanism Assy+Despin 1 Titanium (6 Al-4 V) Cylinder 22.3 22.3 0.45 0.69 0.22 66 1.339 22.34 15824.1
170 GMI ISS A-Bipod Int. Fit. - End 6 Titanium (6 Al-4 V) Box 0.2 0.2 0.11 0.13 0.01 78 0.474 0.24 76.1
172 GMI IBA Lau. Rest. Fit. Rect. End 8 Titanium (6 Al-4 V) Box 0.1 0.1 0.08 0.11 0.01 88 0.451 0.1 19.5
206 SA MOOG MC464 2 Titanium (6 Al-4 V) Cylinder 10.3 10.3 0.11 0.25 0.06 76 0.564 7.03 22697.4
221 HGAS Elbow (SS piece) 1 Stainless Steel 17-4 ph Box 0.6 0.7 0.12 0.14 0.03 0.03 77 0.494 0.56 284.1
224 HGAS Gimbal Assembly 1 Titanium (6 Al-4 V) Box 5.8 15.7 0.39 0.45 0.27 0.27 60 0.972 5.82 1909.9
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Gamma-ray Large Area Space Telescope 
(GLAST) Spacecraft
• In 2000 GSFC requested assistance in evaluating the reentry risk hazard 
associated with the primary instrument of the GLAST spacecraft, then 
expected to launch in 2006.
– The instrument accounted for 3000 kg of the 4500 kg total spacecraft mass.
– As with GPM, an objective was to determine whether or not a spacecraft propulsion 
system would need to be sized for a controlled reentry (propulsion not required for 
science mission).
• The unique construction of the GLAST primary instrument led to a very 
large amount of surviving debris (> 2000 m2 debris casualty area).  
However, these debris were very light-weight and posed no risk of human 
casualty.
– An ORSAT analysis led to a halving of the
foil sheets to reduce impact energy below 15 J.
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Gamma-ray Large Area Space Telescope 
(GLAST) Spacecraft  (continued)
• Optical Bench Struts
– Eight titanium optical bench struts were found to survive with impact energies greater 
than 15 J.
– ORSAT assessments found that graphite epoxy struts would demise.
• Large Area Telescope Flexures
– Titanium flexures were found to survive, but a change of material to stainless steel or 
aluminum was not desirable.
– However, a change in shape of the flexures led to a change in ballistic coefficient, 
which in turn yielded a demisable flexure.
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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Radiation Belt Storm Probes (RBSP) Ballast
• The RBSP mission employs two 550-kg-class spacecraft in highly elliptical 
Earth orbits.  At the end of mission, the two probes will be maneuvered into 
a lower orbit for natural reentry within the 25-year requirement.
• Each probe carries balance weights with a total mass of approximately 30-
40 kg.  The original design called for the use of 1-kg weights made of 
tungsten.  However, an ORSAT analysis found that each weight would 
survive reentry with impact energies greater than 15 J, making the vehicle 
non-compliant for reentry risks.
• Different materials were also evaluated with ORSAT:  tantalum (also 
survived) and lead (demised).
• A final design using very thin plates of tungsten bound together with a thin 
aluminum band was found to meet reentry risk requirements.
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Miscellaneous Design for Demise Efforts
• D4D activities are now a routine part of ORSAT assessments for NASA 
spacecraft.  
• Components which show a potential for survival are reevaluated for means 
to promote demise, including material changes and construction designs.
– The use of titanium, beryllium, and stainless steel is discouraged.
• In supporting one of the ISS COTS contractors, the amount of surviving 
hazardous material has been significantly reduced by replacing the material 
of numerous components with aluminum.
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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Introduction
• The NASA Debris Assessment Software (DAS) is actually a set of custom 
tools designed to assist space programs and projects in preparing orbital 
debris assessment reports.
– Assessment requirements are described in NASA Standard 8719.14A, “Process for 
Limiting Orbital Debris”
– DAS 2.0 addresses most requirements point-by-point
• Reasons for the upgrade to DAS 2.0 are numerous, including:
– Issuance of NS 8719.14 to replace NSS 1740.14, i.e., changes in debris mitigation 
guidelines
– Improvements to the orbit propagators and debris environment model
– Improvements to the reentry survivability model and casualty estimation method
– Improvements to the user interface and documentation
– Improvements to personal computers, e.g., operating systems and capabilities
– Recommendations from users of the early versions of DAS
• Download software and reference materials at:
http://www.orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov/mitigate/das.html
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
3 Orbital Debris Program Office
User Interface
• Microsoft Windows User Interface
– DAS 2.0 uses a “native” Windows graphical user interface (GUI).
– Runs on Windows 2000, XP, Vista, and Windows 7.
– The GUI consolidates user input and avoids long chains of menus.
• “Project” Orientation
– DAS 2.0 saves the user’s input and output files as a “project” in a single directory.
– Other files and directories are not affected by the projects.
– Moving or sharing a project is as simple as moving or sharing the project directory.
• Division of Modules
– Mission Editor
– Requirement Assessments
– Science and Engineering Utilities
– Supporting features
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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DAS 2.0 User Interface
The DAS 2.0 top-level window, and three main dialog windows.
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GUI: Mission Editor
• The user enters most of the mission information into the Mission Editor.
• Most assessments are complete using only the information in the Mission Editor.
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GUI: Requirement Assessments
The user may assess the mission’s compliance with each requirement.
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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GUI: Sample Requirement Assessment
The right-hand pane shows inputs, outputs, and compliance status.
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GUI: Science and Engineering Utilities
These utilities allow the user to explore options in mission design
and to perform other supporting calculations.
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GUI: Other Supporting Features
• Customizable plots
• Material properties database
• Text activity log
• Date conversion tool
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Summary
• DAS is the standard method of assessing compliance with NASA’s space 
debris mitigation requirements (NS 8719.14A).
– DAS provides point-by-point assessment of a mission’s compliance with NASA’s 
requirements.
– Results from DAS may be included in reports to NASA.
– DAS provides additional tools for mission-planning and input conversion.
• The modular internal structure of the software allows for easy updates 
(such as to the debris environment model or the human population density) 
in the future.  Solar activity forecasts are updated quarterly.
• Software and documentation are available on the NASA Orbital Debris 
Program Office’s internet site:
http://www.orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov/mitigate/das.html
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DAS Reentry Survivability Analysis
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DAS Reentry Survivability Analysis
• JSC Debris Assessment Software (DAS)
• Developed to assist NASA programs in performing orbital debris assessments 
• Able to evaluate compliance with many of the requirements in NS 8719.14A
• Reentry Survivability Analysis in DAS can be accessed in 2 ways
1. As one item in an overall assessment of a project’s compliance with NS 8719.14A
• Provides Debris Casualty Area (DCA) and Risk
• Inclination and Parent Objects flow down from Mission Editor
2. As a separate routine under the Science and Engineering menu
• Provides DCA only
• Runs separate from Mission Editor 
• All data provided by user at run time
• DAS can only asses the risk associated with uncontrolled reentry
• DAS’s Reentry Survivability Tool is intended as “1st Cut” Assessment Tool
• Provides somewhat conservative results
• Will classify all missions which clearly do not satisfy the requirement non-compliant
• May also classify some mission which  are borderline  non-compliant
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DAS Reentry Survivability Analysis
• Assumptions:
Uses temperature dependent material properties for 77 common materials
• Allows user to define additional materials as needed
Includes aerodynamic and heating equations for 4 simple shapes
• Sphere        •          Cylinder
• Flat Plate  •          Box
Parent Object is assumed to break apart at 78 km, exposing 1st level of fragments
• DAS permits 3 levels of fragmentation after the 78 km Parent body break up
Fragments always begin with a temperature of 300 K 
• Only inherits trajectory state vectors from the parents
Uses lumped mass thermal model
• No partial ablation means the DCA for an object is either 0 (demised) or the usual product of 
initial dimensions
DCA for each object is calculated as follows:
• DCA = (0.6 + √A)2
• Additional area accounts for presence of person in proximity to reentering object
• Area defined for each shape as:
Spheres      →   A = π*r2 Cylinders    →   A = L*D
Flat Plates  →   A = L*W Boxes         →   A = ½*(W*L+L*H)
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DAS Reentry Survivability Analysis
Select Science and Engineering
Select Reentry Survivability Analysis
• What is being illustrated in this tutorial is the use of the Science and Engineering 
menu.
• Any significant differences between it and the Requirements Assessment menu 
will be highlighted.
• Getting Started
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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DAS Reentry Survivability Analysis
• Object Modeling
• The “Root Object” is the overall vehicle being analyzed.
• The mass of this object is the total mass of the entire vehicle
• This object is used only to propagate the trajectory from 122 km to 78 km altitude
• Here the inclination is entered for the vehicle, under Requirements 
Assessment the inclination would have been populated using the Mission 
Editor  value.
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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DAS Reentry Survivability Analysis
• Object Modeling (cont.)
• Both the Material Type and Object Shape are drop down menus.
• Material Type includes all 77 built in materials representing some of the most 
commonly used materials
• Object Shape lists the 4 object types used in DAS
• What if the proper material is not included?
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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DAS Reentry Survivability Analysis
• Material Database
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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DAS Reentry Survivability Analysis
• Material Database (cont.)
• Allows the user to input additional materials not included in the standard list
• Requires non-temperature dependent values for material properties
• Saves materials to “matprops.csv” in the current working directory
• Adds custom material to the drop down menu in alphabetical order
• It is important to note that the composite materials built into DAS (i.e. Graphite 
Epoxy) are sometimes best defined using the Material Database, as the 
properties of these materials can vary significantly depending on the 
manufacturer.
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DAS Reentry Survivability Analysis
• Object Nesting
• Each fragment of the vehicle can have up to 3 layers of internal fragments.
• Fragment masses should be thermal masses which do not account for the mass 
of any contents.
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DAS Reentry Survivability Analysis
• After entering in all component information, hit “Run” to get results.
• At this point DAS will verify the following:
• All required fields are filled for each object
• The entered mass does not exceed a limit defined by an object’s dimensions and 
its material density
• For flat plates the computed density is based on an assumed height of 1/10 
the width
• Plates that do not pass input validation or are thicker, should be modeled as 
boxes
• For boxes, the values must be entered such that Length ≥ Width ≥ Height
• A cylinder must have a length of at least 30% of its diameter
• If its length is less than 10% of its diameter then model it as a flat square 
plate of equivalent area
• If its length is between 10% and 30% of its area than it should be modeled as 
a box of equivalent area
• If any of the data is not valid, the assessment ceases and the data must be corrected 
before continuing
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DAS Reentry Survivability Analysis
• Results
Results from Science and Engineering Routine
• Gives DCA and impact Kinetic Energy for 
each object
• Gives total DCA of all objects which impact 
with a Kinetic Energy greater than 15 J
Results from Requirements Assessment Routine
• Reports total risk for the calculated reentry 
year
• States whether or not compliant
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DAS Reentry Survivability Analysis
• Saving
• Modeling data and results are saved to .csv files able to be opened by Excel.
• Clicking Save in the Science and Engineering Routine allows the user to define 
file name and save location.
• The Requirements Assessment Routine saves the data and results to 
“reentry.csv” in the project directory.
• Importing 
• Data can be entered into a .csv file and imported into DAS using Excel using the 
following format.
• Note if importing into the Requirements Assessment Routine, omit the first row.
Reentry Data
Row Num Name Parent Qty Material Body Type Thermal Mass Diameter/Width Length Height
1Root Object 0 1Aluminum 2024‐T3 Box 600 2 3 1
2Battery Box 1 1Aluminum 2024‐T3 Box 0.85 0.1 0.1 0.05
3Battery Cell 2 6Stainless Steel 17‐4 ph Cylinder 0.035 0.0125 0.085
4Cell Inner Structure 3 6Copper Alloy Cylinder 0.015 0.012 0.08
5Anode 4 6Platinum Cylinder 0.01 0.011 0.02
6 Frame Structure 2 1Aluminum 2024‐T3 Box 0.001 0.95 0.95 0.001
7 Tank 1 1Titanium (6 Al‐4 V) Sphere 85 1
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DAS Reentry Survivability Analysis
• Known Limitations
• Honeycomb Panels
• Typically these panels consist of a layer of aluminum honeycomb 
sandwiched between two aluminum or composite face sheets.
• Due to the limitation of the thermal model these objects often survive a 
DAS reentry analysis and require ORSAT analysis.
• Objects with complex shapes
• Items in this category constructed of a single material can be modeled 
using equivalent area simplified shapes.
• Items constructed of multiple materials are more complex and typically 
require ORSAT analysis.
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DAS Reentry Survivability Analysis
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DAS Reentry Survivability Analysis
• JSC Debris Assessment Software (DAS)
• Developed to assist NASA programs in performing orbital debris assessments 
• Able to evaluate compliance with many of the requirements in NSS 8719.14
• Reentry Survivability Analysis in DAS can be accessed in 2 ways
1. As one item in an overall assessment of a project’s compliance with NSS 8719.14
• Provides Debris Casualty Area (DCA) and Risk
• Inclination and Parent Objects flow down from Mission Editor
2. As a separate routine under the Science and Engineering menu
• Provides DCA only
• Runs separate from Mission Editor 
• All data provided by user at run time
• DAS can only asses the risk associated with uncontrolled reentry
• DAS’s Reentry Survivability Tool is intended as “1st Cut” Assessment Tool
• Provides somewhat conservative results
• Will classify all missions which clearly do not satisfy the requirement non-compliant
• May also classify some mission which  are borderline  non-compliant
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DAS Reentry Survivability Analysis
• Assumptions:
Uses temperature dependent material properties for 77 common materials
• Allows user to define additional materials as needed
Includes aerodynamic and heating equations for 4 simple shapes
• Sphere        •          Cylinder
• Flat Plate  •          Box
Parent Object is assumed to break apart at 78 km, exposing 1st level of fragments
• DAS permits 3 levels of fragmentation after the 78 km Parent body break up
Fragments always begin with a temperature of 300 K 
• Only inherits trajectory state vectors from the parents
Uses lumped mass thermal model
• No partial ablation means the DCA for an object is either 0 (demised) or the usual product of 
initial dimensions
DCA for each object is calculated as follows:
• DCA = (0.6 + √A)2
• Additional area accounts for presence of person in proximity to reentering object
• Area defined for each shape as:
Spheres      →   A = π*r2 Cylinders    →   A = L*D
Flat Plates  →   A = L*W Boxes         →   A = ½*(W*L+L*H)
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DAS Reentry Survivability Analysis
Select Science and Engineering
Select Reentry Survivability Analysis
• What is being illustrated in this tutorial is the use of the Science and Engineering menu
• Any significant differences between it and the Requirements Assessment menu will 
be highlighted
• Getting Started
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DAS Reentry Survivability Analysis
• Object Modeling
• The “Root Object” is the overall vehicle being analyzed
• The mass of this object is the total mass of the entire vehicle
• This object is used only to propagate the trajectory from 122 km to 78 km altitude
• Here the inclination is entered for the vehicle, under Requirements Assessment the 
inclination would have been populated using the Mission Editor  value
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
6
DAS Reentry Survivability Analysis
• Object Modeling (cont.)
• Both the Material Type and Object Shape are drop down menus
• Material Type includes all 77 built in materials representing some of the most commonly used 
materials
• Object Shape lists the 4 object types used in DAS
• What if the proper material is not included?
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DAS Reentry Survivability Analysis
• Material Database
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DAS Reentry Survivability Analysis
• Material Database (cont.)
• Allows the user to input additional materials not included in the standard list
• Requires non-temperature dependent values for material properties
• Saves materials to “matprops.csv” in the current working directory
• Adds custom material to the drop down menu in alphabetical order
• It is important to note that the composite materials built into DAS (i.e. Graphite 
Epoxy) are sometimes best defined using the Material Database, as the 
properties of these materials can vary significantly depending on the 
manufacturer
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DAS Reentry Survivability Analysis
• Object Nesting
• Each fragment of the vehicle can have up to 3 layers of internal fragments
• Fragment masses should be thermal masses which do not account for the mass 
of any contents
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DAS Reentry Survivability Analysis
• After entering in all component information hit “Run” to get results
• At this point DAS will verify the following:
• All required fields are filled for each object
• The entered mass does not exceed a limit defined by and object’s dimensions and 
its material density
• For flat plates the computed density is based on an assumed height of 1/10 
the width
• Plates that do not pass input validation or are thicker, should be modeled as 
boxes
• For boxes, the values must be entered such that Length ≥ Width ≥ Height
• A cylinder must have a length of at least 30% of its diameter
• If its length is less than 10% of its diameter then model it as a flat square 
plate of equivalent area
• If its length is between 10% and 30% of its area than it should be modeled as 
a box of equivalent area
• If any of the data is not valid, the assessment ceases and the data must be corrected 
before continuing
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DAS Reentry Survivability Analysis
• Results
Results from Science and Engineering Routine
• Gives DCA and impact Kinetic Energy for 
each object
• Gives total DCA of all objects which impact 
with a Kinetic Energy greater than 15 J
Results from Requirements Assessment Routine
• Reports total risk for the calculated reentry 
year
• States whether or not compliant
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
12
DAS Reentry Survivability Analysis
• Saving
• Modeling data and results are saved to .csv files able to be opened by Excel
• Clicking Save in the Science and Engineering Routine allows the user to define 
file name and save location
• The Requirements Assessment Routine saves the data and results to 
“reentry.csv” in the project directory
• Importing 
• Data can be entered into a .csv file and imported into DAS using Excel using the 
following format
• Note if importing into the Requirements Assessment Routine, omit the first row
Reentry Data
Row Num Name Parent Qty Material Body Type Thermal Mass Diameter/Width Length Height
1 Root Object 0 1Aluminum 2024‐T3 Box 600 2 3 1
2Battery Box 1 1Aluminum 2024‐T3 Box 0.85 0.1 0.1 0.05
3Battery Cell 2 6 Stainless Steel 17‐4 ph Cylinder 0.035 0.0125 0.085
4 Cell Inner Structure 3 6Copper Alloy Cylinder 0.015 0.012 0.08
5Anode 4 6Platinum Cylinder 0.01 0.011 0.02
6 Frame Structure 2 1Aluminum 2024‐T3 Box 0.001 0.95 0.95 0.001
7 Tank 1 1Titanium (6 Al‐4 V) Sphere 85 1
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DAS Reentry Survivability Analysis
• Known Limitations
• Honeycomb Panels
• Typically these panels consist of a layer of aluminum honeycomb 
sandwiched between two aluminum or composite face sheets
• Due to the limitation of the thermal model these objects often survive a 
DAS reentry analysis and require higher-fidelity analysis
• Objects with complex shapes
• Items in this category constructed of a single material can be modeled 
using equivalent area simplified shapes
• Items constructed of multiple materials are more complex and typically 
require higher-fidelity analysis
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Reentry Example 1 - GenSat
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Reentry Example 1 - GenSat
Row Num Name Parent Qty Material Body Type Thermal Mass Diameter/Width Length Height
1 GenSat 0 1 Aluminum (generic) Box 391.641 1 2 1
2 Side Panels 1 3 Aluminum (generic) Flat Plate 14.239 1 2 0.0254 Honey Comb
3 Side Panels (with cutout ) 1 1 Aluminum (generic) Flat Plate 12.814 1 2 0.0254 Honey Comb
4 Top Panel 1 1 Aluminum (generic) Flat Plate 7.1196 1 1 0.0254 Honey Comb
5 Mid Panel (with cutout for LH2 tank) 1 1 Aluminum (generic) Flat Plate 5.7004 1 1 0.0254 Honey Comb
6 Bottom Panel (with cutout for LO2 tank) 1 1 Aluminum (generic) Flat Plate 2.6134 1 1 0.0254 Honey Comb
7 Solar Array Boom 1 2 Aluminum (generic) Cylinder 0.71859 0.0254 2.0254 0
8 Battery Box (outer box) 1 1 Aluminum (generic) Box 28.655 0.4668 0.6168 0.3168
9 Battery Box (inner frame, part 1) 8 2 Aluminum (generic) Flat Plate 3.11 0.295788 0.449984 0.008408
10 Battery Box (inner frame, part 2) 8 1 Aluminum (generic) Flat Plate 3.154 0.299984 0.449984 0.008408
11 Mounting Profiles (Battery Box, part 1) 1 2 Aluminum (generic) Flat Plate 0.045 0.0254 0.3168 0.0254
12 Mounting Profiles (Battery Box, part 2) 1 2 Aluminum (generic) Flat Plate 0.066 0.0254 0.4668 0.0254
13 Batteries 8 12 Nickel Cylinder 1.912 0.145788 0.295788 0
14 Solar Panels 1 2 Aluminum (generic) Flat Plate 14.239 1 2 0.0254
15 LH2 Tank 1 1 Titanium (generic) Sphere 10 0.5 0 0
16 LO2 Tank 1 1 Aluminum (generic) Cylinder 38.9 0.8984 1 0
17 Magnetic Torquer Rod 1 3 Iron Cylinder 3.3336 0.045 1 0
18 Star Tracker 1 2 Aluminum (generic) Cylinder 6.5009 0.2 0.45 0
19 Reaction Wheel Assy Housing 1 4 Aluminum (generic) Cylinder 4.36 0.4 0.1 0
20 Reaction Wheel Flywheel 19 4 Titanium (generic) Disk 3.1363 0.3 0 0.01
21 Reaction Wheel Assy Shaft 19 4 Stainless Steel (generic) Cylinder 0.22734 0.02 0.0910812 0
22 Gyroscopes 1 1 Aluminum (generic) Box 9.9036 0.246 0.3295 0.176
23 X‐Band Antenna 1 1 Aluminum (generic) Disk 1.9813 0.6 0 0.0025
24 X‐Band Boom 1 1 Graphite Epoxy 1 Cylinder 3.1928 0.09 1.7 0
25 S‐Band Transponder 1 2 Aluminum (generic) Box 3.2711 0.1 0.2 0.1
26 Computer 1 1 Aluminum (generic) Box 2.0058 0.3 0.6 0.2
27 Data Storage 1 1 Aluminum (generic) Box 16.989 0.2 0.25 0.2
28 Command 1 1 Aluminum (generic) Box 24.867 0.25 0.4 0.15
29 Telemetry 1 1 Aluminum (generic) Box 10.383 0.2 0.3 0.2
30 Louvers (Blades) 1 6 Aluminum (generic) Flat Plate 0.070075 0.05 0.5 0.001
31 Louvers (Shafts) 1 6 Aluminum (generic) Cylinder 0.019021 0.005 0.54 0
32 Louvers (Frame, part 1) 1 2 Aluminum (generic) Flat Plate 0.057181 0.02 0.34 0.003
33 Louvers (Frame, part 2) 1 2 Aluminum (generic) Flat Plate 0.08409 0.02 0.5 0.003
34 Cold Plate 1 1 Aluminum (generic) Flat Plate 13.072 0.34 0.54 0.0254
35 Space Radiator 1 1 Aluminum (generic) Flat Plate 4.2045 0.3 0.5 0.01
36 Cable 1 3 Copper Alloy Cylinder 10.937 0.06 0.5 0
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Reentry Example 2 – Generic Upper Stage
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Reentry Example 2 – Generic Upper Stage
Row Num Name Parent Qty Material Body Type Thermal Mass Diameter/Width Length Height
1 Parent 0 1 Aluminum (generic) Cylinder 924.343 6.3 1.8 0
2 Propellant Tank 1 1 Stainless Steel (gene Cylinder 267.675 2.7 1.7 0
3 Thrust Chamber 1 1 Inconel Cylinder 45.8 0.6 0.44 0
4 Gas Tank 1 1 2 Titanium (generic) Sphere 10.056 0 0.41 0
5 Gas Tank 2 1 2 Titanium (generic) Sphere 30.548 0 0.59 0
6 Nozzle 1 1 Graphite Epoxy 1 Cylinder 99.594 1.6 1 0
7 Engine Support 1 1 Aluminum (generic) Cylinder 52.175 0.43 0.3 0
8 Guidance Electronics 1 8 Aluminum (generic) Box 10.337 0.45 0.5 0.1
